We study how political reservation influences the allocation of environmental disaster relief. Using restricted-access data on human-wildlife conflict in the Indian Himalayas, we first show that tribal communities are more frequently affected by wildlife attacks but receive less compensation than non-tribal groups. We develop a model of political reservation which explains how discrimination against the tribal minority arises. The model predicts that, under political reservation, minority leaders will direct more aid toward their own ethnic group, undoing discrimination. We test these predictions using quasi-random variation from India's system of reserving political seats for tribal candidates. Difference-in-differences estimates show that villages with tribal leaders receive higher levels of compensation per wildlife attack, and that compensation rises faster with tribal population share. This ethnic favouritism is primarily driven by tribal claimants being more effective at negotiating compensation for livestock losses under coethnic leadership. Our findings highlight the importance of political representation in promoting fairness in environmental disaster payouts.
The zoom link to join the seminar online can be found here. This event is open to the public. All who are interested to this topic are very welcome to join the seminar. After the presentation there will be time for questions and discussion.
For any queries related to our UNU-MERIT Seminar Series, please contact Lizeth Melissa Molina Alvarez and Karthika Baby Sujatha by sending an email to seminars@merit.unu.edu.
