Blog Post

Beyond the Veto: How the General Assembly Can Preserve UN Peace Operations

A veto ended the UN mission in Western Sahara after 35 years. Earlier precedents show three ways the Assembly can respond.

The abrupt termination of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), following a veto by the Russian Federation in the Security Council on 30 October, has brought an end to a 35-year peacekeeping presence at a critical moment in political negotiations. With the mission entering liquidation, the UN risks losing important monitoring, reporting and de-escalation capacities at a time when the underlying dispute remains unresolved and tensions have continued along the ceasefire line. The consequences of this sudden withdrawal, and the risks of leaving a security vacuum, were among the concerns raised by Member States during the General Assembly’s debate on the veto on 10 and 11 November.

The MINURSO episode highlights a larger crisis facing UN peace operations. Over the last several years, increasing divides among permanent members have made it much less likely that the Security Council would agree to establish missions, or to maintain missions and other conflict monitoring and management mechanisms that do exist. This has generated an extensive debate over the last few years about the future of peace operations. As part of the Pact for the Future, the General Assembly in 2024 requested a Review of all peace operations, which the Secretariat published in September. Yet the General Assembly can do more than deliberate the end of peace operations (where some fear the conversation is headed); it can directly shape the scope and outcome of this debate by acting on situations like MINURSO’s termination to preserve critical peace and security functions through its own authorities. 

The General Assembly can do more than deliberate the end of peace operations; it can directly shape the scope and outcome of this debate.

The MINURSO Veto and the General Assembly’s Opportunity to Act

Established in 1991 to monitor a ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front and oversee a referendum on the future of Western Sahara, MINURSO has remained in place for 35 years, even as the referendum failed to materialize and the political process stalled. Its monitoring and liaison functions have remained important, particularly following the breakdown of the ceasefire in 2020. Since 2026, these negotiations have gained renewed momentum but remain politically contentious. In October 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2797, renewing MINURSO for one year, but also taking Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the basis for negotiations on the future of Western Sahara, a position that some Council members have expressed reservations about (the Russian Federation abstained from this vote and a non-permanent member at the time, Algeria, chose not to take part). 

The same disagreement resurfaced in this latest debate over MINURSO’s mandate renewal. The US-drafted resolution would have extended the mission (under a different name) for another year, but gone further than the 2025 resolution by identifying Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the “only basis” for continuing negotiations. The Russian Federation vetoed the resolution, arguing that it prejudged the outcome of negotiations. Its alternative proposed resolution would have renewed MINURSO’s existing mandate for another year without further privileging the autonomy proposal, but it failed to secure enough votes. Thus, although Council members remained divided over the political framework for negotiations, all fundamentally agreed on the importance of maintaining the mission. 

Security Council Vote

The Security Council debates the renewal of MINURSO’s mandate. The Russian Federation vetoed a proposed resolution for extending the mission on 30 October, and its alternative proposal for renewal did not receive sufficient votes. Although Council members were divided over the political framework for negotiations, all fundamentally agreed on the importance of maintaining the mission.

UN Photo/Manuel Elias

Enter the General Assembly. The General Assembly took up the issue on 10 November under the Veto Initiative, a procedure created in 2022 that requires the Assembly to convene a formal debate within 10 working days whenever a veto is cast. During the debate Member States across a range of regional groups highlighted concerns about the sudden loss of the UN’s monitoring presence and its implications for security and the political process. 

Yet the Assembly’s role need not end with debate. Its historical practice suggests at least three ways it could take more direct action to preserve MINURSO or some of its essential functions.

1. A Temporary Extension to Allow Negotiations to Continue

One possibility would be for the General Assembly to provide a temporary extension of MINURSO’s mandate, allowing additional time for the Security Council and the parties to negotiate its future. 

Although rare, there are precedents for the Assembly extending or supplementing Security Council-authorized peace operations when divisions prevented the Council from taking necessary action. In 1958, following deadlock over how to respond to escalating tensions in Lebanon, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan. This effectively added tasks to the Security Council-authorized United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), in a way that would enable it to deal with new parameters of the conflict.

In 1960, the Assembly similarly interposed after Council divisions prevented agreement on how to reinforce the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), adopting a resolution that strengthened the mission’s role and mandate for maintaining law and order and safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity and political independence. In 1963, the Assembly also used its budgetary authority to extend ONUC’s duration for an additional six months, through resolution 1885 (XVIII).

These interventions were controversial at the time. However, in its 1962 Certain Expenses advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) specifically affirmed the Assembly’s powers to mandate such tasks and pass resolutions with operational effect. Specifically, the case considered the Assembly’s authorization of a 1956 peace operation – United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) – and its actions in relation to ONUC, effectively affirming the Assembly’s power to create peacekeeping missions and support or extend the tasks of those created by the Council. 

There is one important clarification worth mentioning here: the Assembly’s intervention in the three cases described above took place in the context of a Uniting for Peace resolution – a procedural mechanism introduced in 1950 to enable quick General Assembly review where lack of unanimity prevents the Council from addressing threats to or breaches of peace. However, the ICJ’s decision did not find that the Assembly’s powers to create or engage with operational bodies depended on this. Subsequent decisions have affirmed that the Uniting for Peace resolution is simply a procedural mechanism, not unlike the Veto Initiative. It is a way to quickly bring the matter to the Assembly without a ready agenda item. It does not add to the Assembly’s underlying powers. 

The Uniting for Peace resolutions is simply a procedural mechanism ... It does not add to the Assembly's underlying powers.

In the present case, the Assembly could consider a similarly limited intervention — for example a six-month extension of MINURSO, either through passing an Assembly resolution extending its mandate (the 1963 ONUC route) or extending it for a short period through budgetary arrangements. This would not require the Assembly to resolve the underlying dispute over Western Sahara or endorse either side’s preferred political framework. Either route could be undertaken with the express intention of preserving existing monitoring and de-escalation functions for a short period, to provide the Security Council the opportunity to resolve its differences over the future mandate and process. 

While this sort of Assembly engagement has been contested in the past (indeed, objections by two permanent Council members helped precipitate the Certain Expenses case), in this case it might offer a politically acceptable way forward for Council members that disagreed over the proposed mandate but not the continuation of the mission in principle.

There would be legal and practical questions to resolve, including the basis for continued deployment, financing and the cooperation of the parties. And the timing of such action would be critical. MINURSO’s mandate expired on 31 October, and the UN has already initiated liquidation arrangements. Yet the withdrawal of personnel and equipment is a process, rather than an instantaneous event. Assembly action during this transition, including through the relevant budgetary decisions, could potentially preserve remaining operational capacities before they are dismantled.

Dulles addresses UNGA
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles addresses an emergency special session of the General Assembly during the 1956 Suez Crisis. During the session, the Assembly authorized the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first armed UN peacekeeping operation. UN Photo

2. Establishing a New Assembly-Mandated Mission

A second possibility would be for the General Assembly to authorize a new peace operation to replace MINURSO.

The Assembly has a longstanding authority to mandate peace operations under its Charter powers. It was the Assembly, not the Security Council, that authorized the first armed UN peacekeeping operation, UNEF, in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis. It has also mandated subsequent peace operations in alternative settings, including Indonesia, Guatemala, Haiti and Afghanistan (notably, none of these four operations were authorized in a Uniting for Peace context). Although not required for the Assembly to engage, in most of these cases the General Assembly authorization of a peace operation came after years of General Assembly engagement with the matter, for example, supporting good offices, humanitarian relief or other measures. This is also the case with MINURSO: there have been General Assembly resolutions related to good offices and other measures related to Western Sahara dating back to 1965. 

This would be legally possible in principle, but politically more demanding than a temporary extension. It would require agreement on a new mandate, and additional financing and operational arrangements to be resolved. Additionally, unlike the Security Council, the Assembly does not have coercive power. Therefore, there must be consent by the government whose territory is involved for any Assembly-authorized peace operation to deploy. MINURSO itself also enjoyed consent and cooperation, so this is not impossible. But it is a delicate situation and the buy-in of all involved Member States and parties would be crucial in conceiving a new mission.

3. Preserving Essential Functions Through a Smaller Operational Mechanism

A third possibility, and one that may offer greater flexibility, would be for Assembly authorities to support a smaller operational body or office that could preserve selected functions of MINURSO without recreating the full peacekeeping mission.

Throughout its history, the General Assembly has authorized or supported a wide range of operational bodies that have taken on functions commonly associated with peace operations without being constituted as conventional peacekeeping or special political missions. These have included ceasefire and border-monitoring mechanisms, good offices and mediation support, joint civilian-military bodies and other specialized arrangements intended to facilitate peace implementation.

Such mechanisms can prove particularly useful when Security Council authorization for a larger peace operation has lapsed, as either a stopgap measure or a means of sustaining processes that might enable the Council to re-engage later. In Afghanistan in March 1990, for example, the Security Council failed to renew a mission it had established to support implementation of the Geneva Accords, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), after not being able to reach an agreement among the parties and guarantors (permanent members of the Security Council) on its continuation. On the same day, relying on an existing General Assembly resolution supporting his good offices, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP). OSGAP took forward some of the peace implementation tasks left unfinished by UNGOMAP and included a Military Advisory Unit to undertake military planning and prepare for possible future UN operational engagement. 

Although not a peacekeeping mission, it provided a means of sustaining some of the UN’s operational and diplomatic engagement after the Council-authorized mission had ended. Importantly, this did not require a new General Assembly resolution. The Secretary-General established OSGAP drawing on authority from General Assembly resolution 43/20, adopted in November 1988, which had supported the Geneva Accords and encouraged his good offices toward a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan. Although adopting a new resolution that requested the Secretary-General to take such measures would be the strongest means of empowering this stopgap measure, given the Assembly’s long record of supporting the Secretary-General’s good offices in Western Sahara, there would likely already be a basis for supporting such an office or operational body even without a new resolution. 

This option could preserve some monitoring, liaison or de-escalation functions, maintaining reporting on security developments and communication between the parties while negotiations continue. It would not necessarily replicate MINURSO's military monitoring capacity but could prevent the complete loss of UN operational engagement during Council deadlock.

Opportunities Beyond MINURSO

The opportunity to take action on MINURSO is the most recent example of how the Assembly could help shape the future of peace operations through directly supporting these or related mechanisms. But, it is not the only one. Security Council divisions have repeatedly threatened the continuation of mechanisms performing important monitoring and conflict-management functions. 

In September, China and the Russian Federation vetoed the renewal of the Panel of Experts that monitors implementation of the Iran sanctions regime, the third panel that has been vetoed since the Veto Initiative was established (following the Mali Panel of Experts in 2023 and the DPRK Panel of Experts in 2024). Panels of Experts provide an important monitoring and accountability function that can enhance the work of peace operations and also reinforce other means of managing international tensions and sources of violence. The General Assembly, not the Security Council, was arguably the first to create a standing committee to monitor implementation of recommended sanctioning measures, an early precursor to contemporary sanctions-monitoring mechanisms, and has also created other investigatory bodies. When these vetoes came before the Assembly as part of the Veto Initiative debates (see summaries here), an option would have been for the Assembly to take action and support the extension of these Panels of Experts. 

UN71083182_20250117 UNIFIL- SG_Naqoura 04_Production Size (2000x2000).jpg
UN Secretary-General António Guterres visits troops serving with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In August 2025, the Security Council renewed UNIFIL’s mandate until 31 December 2026. However, continued tensions along the Blue Line have reinforced the need for international monitoring, liaison and de-escalation capacities beyond the mission’s closure. 
UN Photo/Pasqual Gorriz

Another immediate example, though not in a veto context, relates to the planned closure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In August 2025, the Security Council renewed its operations until 31 December 2026. Yet continued tensions along the Blue Line – the demarcation line dividing Lebanon from Israel and the Golan Heights – and the risks of renewed escalation have reinforced the need to retain some international monitoring, liaison and de-escalation capacity after UNIFIL's departure. Though there were various proposals over the spring and summer to extend the mandate, or potentially replace UNIFIL with a downsized mission model that would retain certain core functions, divergence among the five permanent members has meant that none were adopted. Instead, worried about the security vacuum that this would leave at a tense moment, penholder France has floated a stopgap solution. Though details are sparse, the proposal appears to be a joint France-Italy multinational force that would take up some of UNIFIL’s critical tasks.

While this might be a workable solution, it would be stronger with an international mandate, which could equally be provided by the General Assembly. An Assembly mandate for the new multinational force replacing UNIFIL could give it broader political legitimacy, establish a formal connection to UN institutional support capacities and reinforce the international framework for monitoring and de-escalation. Lebanon has explicitly requested an extension of UNIFIL and indicated its support for an alternative international force, eliminating one potential obstacle to Assembly authorization (given the consent issue noted above). 

An Assembly mandate for the new multinational force replacing UNIFIL could give it broader political legitimacy, establish a formal connection to UN institutional support capacities and reinforce the international framework for monitoring and de-escalation.

As with MINURSO, the objective would not necessarily be to reproduce the existing peacekeeping operation. Rather, it would be to consider how essential monitoring, liaison and de-escalation functions might be sustained through a different institutional arrangement, supported by the General Assembly where Security Council agreement is unavailable.

A Broader Role for the Assembly in Supporting Peace Operations and Other Conflict Management Mechanisms

The purpose of revisiting these possibilities is not to suggest that the General Assembly can readily replace the Security Council as the principal body authorizing peace operations, or that smaller and more specialized mechanisms can substitute for multidimensional peacekeeping in every context. The recent Review of the Future of Peace Operations recognizes that the UN’s repertoire extends well beyond large multidimensional missions, encompassing a broad spectrum of political, military and civilian tools and capacities. Yet realizing this wider range of possibilities will require reconsidering not only the models and capacities available, but also the political and institutional pathways through which they can be authorized and supported. The General Assembly has a potentially important role in this shift, drawing on authorities it has exercised in the past but made comparatively little use of in recent decades.

The Veto Initiative has already created a regular opportunity for the Assembly to examine situations in which Council divisions have prevented action. MINURSO illustrates how these debates could become opportunities for more concrete responses, including preserving essential operational functions, providing a bridge to renewed Council engagement or supporting alternative forms of international presence. This type of action could also give the Veto Initiative a more substantial role, moving it beyond debate and accountability toward becoming a vehicle for practical responses to Council deadlock. Making greater use of such opportunities would not only help address the crisis facing peace operations, but also revitalize the General Assembly's role in supporting the Security Council's responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

 


 

This article draws on research conducted through the Assembly for Peace initiative, which documents General Assembly powers and past practice on peace and security issues. It also draws on a forthcoming UNU-CPR study on peace operations and regional conflict supported by the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the UK Government, nor of any of the Member States or entities supporting the Assembly for Peace initiative.