Can COP31 Accelerate Climate Action?

This article was first published on the Environmental Law and Policy Insights Kyoto Environmental Law & Policy (KELP) Column website. The original article is also available in Japanese.

The 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), or COP31, will be held from 9 to 20 November 2026 in Antalya, a city in southern Türkiye. This column considers this year’s negotiations based on information available at the time of writing (1 October 2026). It does not aim to explain the technical details of the anticipated agenda items. Instead, it will consider several key points within the wider context, thereby offering a broad perspective. Please note that I am not inside the negotiations and the column refers to information that is publicly available only.

Unprecedented Dual-Presidency

For those following the negotiations, it is an ideal time to take stock of the available information. The annotated provisional agendas have been posted on the UNFCCC website, and the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly — which sometimes offers glimpses into Parties’ intentions in the run-up to the COP — has also concluded. On 23 September, a “High-Level Event on Climate Action and Just Transitions” was held as part of the UN General Assembly High-Level Week. Meanwhile, the Pre-COP, which serves as preparation for the main conference, is scheduled to take place in Fiji and Tuvalu from 5 to 8 October this year. Why is the Pre-COP being held in Pacific island countries? Let’s start from there. I wrote above that COP31 will be held in Türkiye. You may have assumed that Türkiye is the COP Presidency this year, but that is not quite accurate. Following coordination that lasted until the very end of COP30, it was decided that Türkiye and Australia will jointly hold the presidency. This is the first time in the roughly 30-year history of the COP that more than one country will hold the presidency. Accordingly, in addition to the usual rules governing negotiations, a document has been prepared outlining the division of roles. Put simply, Türkiye will serve as the host country and COP President, while Australia will serve as the President of Negotiations.

The Pacific island countries have been affected by this arrangement. When Australia announced its intention to host COP31, it stated that it would co-host the conference with Pacific island countries. This is part of the reason why the Pre-COP is being held in Fiji and Tuvalu. The Pacific island countries had presumably made preparations to co-host the COP, and perhaps for that reason, there are notable developments.

In particular, the Pacific Resilience Facility, a regional financing mechanism, was launched at the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting held in September (with Japan contributing USD 3 million). Further contributions will be pursued through the Pre-COP and after.

Although the COP Presidency is expected to facilitate the negotiations from a neutral position, it nevertheless exerts certain influence on their direction in various ways. For COP31, it will be interesting to see how the dual-presidency arrangement affects the negotiations, including the final stages.

Will shared presidency between a developing and a developed country help steer difficult negotiations in a constructive direction? Australia’s repeated emphasis on the involvement of Pacific island countries should be noted from this perspective, too.

COP31 and its Context

Ten years have passed since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. This milestone is regarded in academic circles as a good opportunity for reflection, and various related journals and academic associations have arranged special features. There is no doubt that the Paris Agreement has been effective. For instance, an analysis suggests that if countries fulfill their current pledges, the projected temperature rise could be limited to around 2.4°C, compared with approximately 3.5°C projected when the Paris Agreement was adopted.

Nevertheless, given that the targets are 2°C and 1.5°C, climate action is lagging behind. For example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report “Limiting Overshoot”, released on 2 September, shows that policy discussions have already begun on the premise that exceeding 1.5°C for a certain period of time will likely be unavoidable.

Moreover, there is a trend of pushback against climate action. The fact that the United States is clearly opposed to climate action is, of course, highly significant. Looking also at political climate in countries such as Colombia, it would be too optimistic to regard this as an exceptional trend confined to the United States alone.

Thus, COP31 will take place in a context of delayed climate action and growing pushbacks.

Every June, preparatory meetings called the Subsidiary Body meetings are held in Bonn, Germany, and their conclusions serve as the starting point for the negotiations. However, there is a concerning outlook from this year’s Bonn meeting. Some observers characterized the outcome of the Bonn meeting in a single word: “gridlock.” The principal reason seems to be the continuing divergence between developed and developing countries over financing issues.

Then, the problem is not simply that climate action is facing pushback; there are also fault lines within the dynamics of the negotiations themselves. These divisions have brought agenda items that are not directly concerned with finance — such as the agenda on the Global Goal on Adaptation — to a standstill.  　

With many agenda items on which progress is expected — including the Mitigation Work Programme, carbon markets (referred to simply as “Article 6” in the negotiations), and just transition — the question is whether Parties, under the dual-presidency, can make progress in mitigating this gridlock. A bit rough, but this will be the broad perspective towards the negotiations.

The above outlook may have left a somewhat pessimistic impression. COPs, however, are not limited to negotiations. Various initiatives outside the negotiation are also important. Broadly speaking, against the backdrop of the urgent need for climate action, these initiatives bring together countries and organizations that share common interests and values to take action without waiting for often-delayed negotiations.

The COP, a forum for negotiations, also brings together numerous stakeholders with side events and other activities, thereby serving as a source of momentum in climate politics. These activities take place outside the formal negotiations and, in principle, are not legally binding. But this does not necessarily mean that they are less significant. The Global Methane Pledge (COP26) was an outcome outside the negotiations, yet it can have an impact comparable to that of COP decisions. Another key development is the “International Conference on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels,” discussed during the COP30 negotiations and subsequently moved outside the negotiations. The Action Agenda, which is now customary for the COP Presidency to prepare, is another typical example of initiatives outside the negotiations. Türkiye leads its preparation this year. Ten priority areas have been identified, including zero waste, oceans, and food security, and efforts will be made to promote climate action through the process different from COP decisions.

The “COP,” encompassing these diverse elements, lies at the heart of global climate governance. And its broader structure is itself undergoing dynamic change. I would conclude this section by touching on this point. The Asia Zero Emission Community, for example, places importance on consistency with the Paris Agreement while also having its own dynamics and considerable practical significance as a distinct form of Japan’s climate diplomacy toward Asia. Climate litigation, which may become even more active around the world following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion, is also gaining influence as a process of norm formation distinct from negotiations. Several such cases have been introduced in the KELP Column.

Although I cannot discuss these developments in detail here, a broader perspective on global climate governance is becoming increasingly important against several backgrounds: the shift from negotiation to implementation, efforts to respond to the constraints and delays inherent in negotiations, and developments such as the ICJ Advisory Opinion. This also reflects the fact that climate change is a complex, cross-cutting issue. Legal and social scientific research to unpack these dynamics is likewise an urgent task. In turn, the focus of COPs — and of the negotiations — may eventually shift toward providing coherence and momentum to these diverse developments. Through polycentric approaches, a wide range of actors are working to counter delays in climate action and the pushbacks it faces.

From Confrontation to Solidarity: Nepal’s Appeal

From negotiation to implementation. From words to action. These have become buzzwords of negotiations in recent years. At COP31, participants will likewise call for implementation and action amid complex and demanding negotiations. With pushbacks mounting, the dual-presidency will face the difficult task of steering the process.

The fault lines over finance and other issues run deep, but Parties will be expected to find landing zones on each agenda item and adopt strong COP decisions aimed at cooperative climate action. In this context, I would like to conclude by quoting remarks by Nepalese Prime Minister Balendra Shah during the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly. 
On 26 August 2026, a glacier collapse and the resulting landslide caused tragic flooding along the border of Nepal and Tibet, Autonomous Region of China. According to a 29 September update from the Japanese Red Cross Society, 1,451 people died, and 5,745 remain missing.

This column’s key message is that COPs are not just about negotiations; they are, in essence, the forum to strengthen the global momentum for climate action. The details of the negotiations matter precisely because they serve to sustain and reinforce the broader currents of climate action. As the contexts of the negotiations become increasingly complex, views on COPs will also become more diverse. Interested readers are encouraged to explore a variety of other commentaries and analyses. If some of them present a worldview different from this article, you can gain a sense of the complexity of climate change as a policy challenge. As this column indicates, the interest and engagement of more people are now needed as one of the most important sources of energy for climate action.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations University.