Revisiting the Peacebuilding Commission's "bridging" and advisory role

The formal process of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) will kick off in the new year. The PBAR, which happens every five years, brings together the UN, Member States and civil society and regional partners to reflect on the state of the Peace and Security architecture within the UN system. It is an opportunity to take stock of progress made on peacebuilding and to identify gaps and approaches to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of the peace and security architecture. Consultations have been ongoing throughout 2024, and as with each PBAR process, the culmination will be twin resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council taking up some of the recommendations, findings and proposals for reform. 

One prominent proposal that has arisen is the idea of strengthening the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which was created jointly by the Security Council and the General Assembly in 2005 (through the first PBAR process of joint resolutions on peacebuilding). From the onset it was imbued with the power to provide advice to the Security Council upon request, and these advisory provisions were further strengthened in the 2020 PBAR. 

In practice, however, the PBC’s advisory role has often been seen as too little, too late. The PBC might only consider a particular country context or thematic issue each year, for instance, or once every several years. As a result, where the PBC has provided advice (at the Security Council’s request), it “rarely introduces new information, analysis and insights”, certainly nothing that Security Council members have not already heard. In addition, because the PBC operates on consensus, any advice or recommendations have to be acceptable to all 31 members, which includes the permanent five members of the Security Council, members of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as well as top troop and financial contributors. This consensus decision-making tends to mean that PBC advice represents the “lowest common denominator” rather than cutting edge insights. 

All of this has led to a growing drumbeat of support for addressing these issues – and strengthening the PBC’s advisory role to the Security Council. In a recent Chatham House rules-governed conference that I attended (part of the consultations feeding into the formal PBAR process), nearly all of the Member States present, as well as several other civil society representatives, called for this. Yet while undoubtedly an important issue, and one that merits more attention, there may be greater dividends from strengthening the PBC’s advisory role to a different institution: the General Assembly. A greater focus on strengthening the PBC’s advisory and bridging role overall – not just to the Security Council – might be the strongest option for the next PBAR. 

Options and rationales for strengthening advice to the Security Council

To frame the debate, it’s helpful to first think through why there is interest in strengthening the PBC’s advisory role to the Security Council – what value would this bring to the peacebuilding field? 

On its face, more timely and fit-for-purpose advice from the PBC could inform Security Council decision-making on pressing issues. This could include, for example, the peacebuilding support that should be enabled in transition situations, as peacekeeping operations withdraw; or ensuring that Security Council decisions on thematic areas take peacebuilding perspectives into account.  Critics might push back, arguing that the Security Council already tends to be sufficiently informed on these perspectives from other sources, but this is at least one of the arguments for why the PBC advisory role was initially established. 

In addition, if the PBC’s advice is heeded by the Security Council, it could strengthen the PBC by giving it more credibility as a significant player in the overall peace and security architecture. Currently the PBC has no mandatory enforcement powers or resources of its own. Member States come to the PBC voluntarily to discuss their experiences and concerns about peacebuilding or conflict prevention issues. If Member States do not see any follow-on or results from coming to the PBC, they will simply stop coming and it will become an irrelevant forum, rather than the central forum for coordinating resources, support and advice on peacebuilding that it was designed to be.

Some also see a stronger PBC as a partial cure to the current deadlock within the Security Council. In the last two years, there have been more vetoes cast by the permanent five members than at any point since the height of the Cold War. This limits Security Council responses to critical peace and security situations and has led many to cast around for alternative institutions or authorizing bodies that could lead the way. For example, amidst ongoing debate about the future of peace operations and the slim prospects for Security Council agreement and authorization of new missions,  the previous chair of the PBC has proposed that the PBC could oversee “a new generation of peace operations”, essentially “light footprint, civilian missions” focused on peacebuilding.  

Some of those calling for strengthening the PBC’s advisory role have suggested remedies: encouraging the PBC to be more selective and strategic in its consultations and advice and focusing on areas where it has a comparative advantage; or strengthening the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), which has a branch that supports the PBC in all its outcome documents. This greater focus and institutional support could improve the quality of the PBC’s reporting, but with little apparent traction on proposals to reform the consensus voting, such reforms can only go so far. 

The advantages of collaborating with the General Assembly 

While the PBC’s relationship with the Security Council and the quality of its outputs are important, the PBC was mandated to have a much wider “bridging” and advisory role across all “the principal organs and relevant entities of the United Nations”. Yet so far, that bridging and advisory role has been limited. One meeting per year is organized between ECOSOC and the PBC, despite the substantial overlaps between ECOSOC’s development mandate and many of the root causes of conflict that peacebuilding seeks to address. 

The General Assembly takes up the topic of peacebuilding once annually, considering both a report by the PBC and the Secretary-General on the topic. It is usually a formal debate, limited to statements welcoming these reports, rather than a substantial engagement on the substance of the report. The PBC’s advisory role to the General Assembly has the potential to become more significant – and could advance peacebuilding priorities and coherence across the system; in some ways much more than the PBC–Security Council relationship. 

While often forgotten or overlooked, the General Assembly was also imbued with a significant peace and security role under the UN Charter, and there is a robust history of exercising that role. UNU-CPR recently published a Digital Handbook for the Office of the President of the General Assembly, Assembly for Peace: A digital handbook on the UN General Assembly’s past practice on peace and security, mandated as part of the General Assembly’s revitalization agenda. The 61 case studies illustrate the multiple ways that the General Assembly has taken forward its Charter authorities to discuss and make recommendations on the maintenance of peace and security, to call attention to issues likely to “endanger peace and security”, and to advance measures for peaceful dispute resolution and promotion of general welfare (supported by Articles 10, 11 and 14).  

For example, the General Assembly has repeatedly mandated peace operations or other bodies that have contributed to critical transition moments – from overseeing elections to monitoring ceasefires and withdrawals, supporting key peacebuilding priorities such as monitoring human rights, strengthening justice and police functions, and facilitating inclusive peace negotiations and transitional justice. It has appointed special envoys, fact-finding missions, accountability mechanisms and otherwise used its good offices roles to promote human rights, sustainable development mechanisms and other issues we would consider crucial for peacebuilding. It has also lent its weight in critical moments of crisis response and management, using its global voice and wide membership body to condemn unconstitutional transitions of power and create pressure for peaceful elections and other key components for sustaining peace. 

Nor is the General Assembly prohibited from engaging on issues or in areas where the Security Council has acted. Several International Court of Justice advisory opinions have confirmed that it has become common and accepted practice, within the scope of the Charter, for the General Assembly to consider matters “in parallel” with the Security Council. 

In addition, unlike the Security Council, the General Assembly engages with a much wider scope of peace and security situations, including all of the various peacebuilding and prevention contexts that are important to the PBC’s mandate. Part of the PBC’s current convening role is to be able to corral Member State attention and support to key peacebuilding arenas, and also to serve as a forum for Member States to share best practices and challenges and exchange advice. These functions could be elevated if exercised in conjunction with, or if extended via the General Assembly, which has a much broader membership to convene, and a global platform for calling attention to issues. According to some of those working with PBC Member States, there has already been some emerging demand for this type of collaboration – for example, with Member States that have been on the PBC’s agenda hoping to leverage that into support for a General Assembly resolution calling attention to their situation. 

Much of the General Assembly’s regular committee work also contributes to the same peace and security processes that a revitalized PBC–Security Council relationship is intended to improve. For example, several General Assembly committees are equally relevant to discussions of transitions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding phases – including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) and the Fourth Committee’s agenda item on special political missions. These could help improve synergies and initiate more effective responses across a range of peacebuilding arenas. 

While the General Assembly has significant potential to advance key peacebuilding priorities, it also faces some limitations. General Assembly recommendations are not binding and do not have the binding or coercive force of a Security Council resolution. However, it’s hard to think of a peacebuilding situation where mandatory or coercive authority would be necessary or appropriate. The Security Council would not, for example, mandate a transitional justice process or compel Member States to pay attention to root causes. For the type of issues that arise most commonly within the peacebuilding space, the General Assembly’s soft power may be more effective and more appropriate.

Another issue with the General Assembly is that the large size can create a sort of collective action problem; its tools and powers are often not brought to bear in relevant situations despite the need. Because of the difficulty of capturing Member State attention in such an environment, General Assembly deliberations and focused attention can tend to miss some of the quiet prevention opportunities or forgotten peacebuilding contexts where they might have the greatest impact. This is why PBC advice to the General Assembly could be much more impactful than its advice to the Security Council: even if the quality of advice was the same, the PBC could provide a degree of focus and attention to key issues that could help overcome this collective action problem or bring General Assembly tools to bear on situations that might not make it on the Security Council’s agenda.

If the PBC were able to create a more active role for the General Assembly in contributing to peacebuilding situations, it would have benefits for both institutions. As noted above, one of the critiques of the PBC is that there is too little follow-on once a Member State raises its concerns. Bringing these issues to a wider audience via the General Assembly or recommending and putting into effect actions via a General Assembly resolution, could all constitute more meaningful follow-on than the current situation, thus addressing some of the credibility issues of the PBC. The General Assembly has also been seeking to revitalize its role on peace and security, in response to frustration with Security Council blockages. This partnership could energize a new space for the General Assembly to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security and by “address[ing] evolving global challenges”, support Action 42 commitments by Member States in the Pact for the Future. 

Strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission’s relationship with the General Assembly

How a closer relationship between the PBC and the General Assembly would work in practice, and how soon we might see the dividends is an unknown question. As one Member State representative at the same consultation conference above noted, the idea of strengthening the PBC’s advisory role to the General Assembly is so far “virgin territory”. 

Yet there are multiple immediate opportunities for buttressing this relationship. First, the upcoming PBAR should include language on strengthening the advisory role of the PBC to the General Assembly; and it would be important for this language to allow advice and consultations to be initiated from both directions, as opposed to the current advice the PBC provides to the Security Council, which is only provided upon request. Otherwise, it would be hard for the PBC to call the General Assembly’s attention to certain issues and provide that focusing function.

This call to deepen the relationship between the PBC and the General Assembly might be situated within a broader call to strengthen the PBC’s “bridging” function with key organs and “relevant entities” as a whole. The relationship should be seen as an additional avenue for strengthening the PBC and its impact on peacebuilding, not as a substitute for continuing to work on the PBC–Security Council relationship, or the PBC relationship with other bodies, such as ECOSOC or the Human Rights Council.

Second, the General Assembly could make way for this deeper partnership by beginning to identify regular pathways for interaction with the PBC. This might require identifying a separate agenda item for consultations with the PBC, or simply ensuring that the existing annual review item offers a more robust space for dialogue, advice and collaboration. As a start, the General Assembly might consider introducing language to this effect within this session’s annual resolution on the revitalization agenda.

Third, Member States in the PBC, or those in relevant parts of the General Assembly or ECOSOC, could begin to take advantage of existing spaces for deeper collaboration. This year, the PBC chair informally briefed the C34 committee, and similar informal engagements and consultations with other relevant committees could be taken forward. The General Assembly might also think about innovative ways to take up key themes and issues that have arisen in the PBC, or in some cases omitted from the PBC, giving them a broader remit. For example, many of the General Assembly’s special sessions have been on themes related to peacebuilding – for example, those on gender equality and development, or on combating corruption. A General Assembly session could take up a theme that the PBC has invested in substantially – for example transitional justice – and give it a broader platform, while maintaining a direct linkage with the PBC by asking for briefings or material to contribute to the special session.

Peacebuilding has emerged in the last decade as one of the most important and dynamic spaces for UN engagement, allowing for important strides in preventing the recurrence or outbreak of conflict, for protecting human rights and for advancing many of the Sustainable Development Goals. Peacebuilding will be on a stronger footing if it receives the support and energies of all key UN institutions and bodies. The upcoming PBAR can help do that by strengthening the PBC’s advisory and bridging roles. But it should do so not by focusing on only one actor within the peace and security architecture, the Security Council, but on the many other bodies and institutions with a potential role to play, including the General Assembly.