

POLICYBRIEF

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Separate Markets, Shared Shield: Designing a New Operating System for GCC Regionalism

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The Challenge: A Shared Strategic Environment, Fragmented Capability

The Gulf has become deeply interconnected across security, infrastructure, technology, logistics, energy, and trade. Maritime routes, missile and drone threats, cyber risks, digital platforms, cloud systems, supply chains, and critical infrastructure all generate effects that extend beyond national borders. A disruption in one part of the region can quickly influence shipping, energy continuity, digital services, investor confidence, and wider strategic stability across the Gulf.¹

These effects are already regional in practice. Missile and drone threats reshape deterrence calculations across the Gulf. Maritime disruption affects shipping routes, insurance costs, logistics, food supply, and investor confidence. Cyber incidents and failures in critical infrastructure can spread through shared technologies, service providers, digital platforms, and supply chains. In many cases, the consequences move faster than existing diplomatic and institutional mechanisms can respond. Therefore, regional interdependence has developed faster than the architecture needed to manage it. The systems that underpin resilience remain largely national, with limited interoperability, fragmented situational awareness, and uneven arrangements for coordinated response. Member

¹ See GCC (2024) and Buzan and Wæver (2003) on shared regional-security exposure and the interdependence of regional threats.

Highlights

The GCC should be assessed by the regional capabilities it creates: its ability to sense emerging risks, interpret shared challenges, coordinate action, retain institutional learning, and adapt under changing conditions.

The Gulf increasingly functions as a shared strategic environment in which maritime security, cyber resilience, critical infrastructure, energy continuity, logistics, and digital systems generate consequences across national borders.

Existing debates framed around political union or loose intergovernmental cooperation do not capture the full range of strategic functions that now require regional coordination.

Separate Markets, Shared Shield offers an operating system in which national economic and development choices remain differentiated while selected strategic functions are strengthened regionally.

Differentiated sovereignty enables member states to preserve national authority while building interoperability, shared capabilities, and coordinated responses where fragmentation has become strategically costly.




Figure 1. From Traditional Regionalism to Regional Statecraft

states continue to invest heavily in national capabilities, but the regional layer connecting those capabilities remains comparatively weak.

The central policy challenge is to align the scale of regional capability with the scale of emerging risk. National sovereignty remains the foundation of the GCC, while several strategic functions now depend on faster coordination, shared awareness, and greater interoperability. The task is to determine which functions should remain nationally differentiated, which should be connected across member states, and which require shared regional capability. Recent developments suggest that the appropriate scale of regional capability may sometimes extend beyond the GCC itself. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan creates a collective-defence arrangement linking a Gulf state with two major external security partners. Its significance for GCC regionalism lies in this institutional geography: some strategic functions may increasingly be organised through overlapping layers of national, GCC, and wider regional cooperation. The policy challenge is to determine at what geographical scale they should be organised and how external capabilities can be connected without weakening GCC coherence or national authority.²

From Institutional Form to Regional Capability

Debates about GCC regionalism have usually centered on institutional choices: deeper economic integration, stronger political coordination, or movement towards some form of union. These questions remain important, but they do not capture many of the cross-border systems now shaping Gulf security and resilience.

Regional exposure increasingly moves through systems that cut across traditional policy boundaries. A cyber incident can affect government continuity, energy infrastructure, finance, logistics, and national security at the same time. Maritime disruption can influence trade, food security, insurance costs, energy exports, and investor confidence across several states. Cloud infrastructure, data systems, payment platforms, ports, and supply chains now carry both economic and strategic significance.³

Policymakers should test if the region has the capabilities to manage shared risks, maintain continuity, and coordinate action across interconnected systems. Cooperation should be designed function by function. Consultation or common standards may be sufficient in some areas; others depend on interoperability, shared platforms, coordinated procedures, or jointly supported capabilities. The choice should reflect the nature of the function, the cost of fragmentation, and its political sensitivity. This places greater emphasis on strategic performance and on organising capability at the

² See the Joint Statement of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (2026) for the collective-defence commitment among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan; see the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2026) for analysis of its implications for evolving regional defence arrangements.

³ Farrell and Newman (2019) explain how interconnected economic and technological networks can become sources of strategic dependence and vulnerability.




Figure 2. Separate Markets, Shared Shield

scale where problems operate. It allows the GCC to preserve national diversity while strengthening the regional functions needed in an increasingly interconnected Gulf.

Separate Markets, Shared Shield

Separate Markets, Shared Shield offers a practical way to organize future GCC cooperation. Different policy domains call for different levels of regional coordination. National diversity can continue to support development and policy experimentation, while selected strategic functions are strengthened collectively.

Here, **separate markets** refers to preserving distinct national development models, economic strategies, and policy choices within an increasingly connected regional economy. It does not challenge existing GCC economic integration or the movement of trade, investment, capital, and people. This approach is built on differentiated sovereignty: each policy function is assigned the level of regional cooperation it requires. National authority remains where independent action is effective, while coordination, interoperability, shared platforms, or selected joint capabilities are developed where fragmentation creates wider risk.

Economic strategies, industrial priorities, investment models, labour-market policies, taxation, and domestic regulation reflect the conditions and ambitions of each member state. Regional cooperation in these areas should improve connectivity, reduce unnecessary friction, and expand mutual opportunity while leaving room for national choice.

The **shared shield** applies to functions where fragmented action creates regional vulnerability. Maritime awareness, missile and drone warning, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure continuity, strategic logistics, energy resilience, and crisis coordination all depend increasingly on systems that cross national boundaries. Stronger regional capability in these areas can improve the security and resilience of every member state.

The Shared Shield can be built through interoperable national systems, common operating pictures, shared standards, coordinated procedures, distributed regional platforms, and selectively pooled capabilities. National institutions would retain authority over their policies and assets while gaining access to broader regional awareness and more reliable mechanisms for coordinated action.

This also gives sovereignty a practical meaning. States strengthen their sovereignty when they can perform essential functions effectively, maintain continuity under pressure, and retain meaningful control over outcomes. Where national systems depend on shared infrastructure, regional information, or cross-border coordination, well-designed cooperation can expand effective sovereign capability.⁴

The model is deliberately flexible. It preserves national autonomy where diversity creates value and builds regional capability where shared exposure makes cooperation necessary. GCC regionalism can then be organised around function, performance, and resilience.

⁴ See Howorth (2019) on sovereignty as effective capability and Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) on differentiated and adaptive forms of shared governance.

Differentiated Sovereignty: Matching Functions to the Right Scale

Differentiated sovereignty offers a practical way to decide how far regional cooperation should extend in each domain. Sovereign functions differ in scale, sensitivity, and dependence on cross-border systems, so the appropriate arrangement should be determined function by function. Some responsibilities remain closely tied to national priorities and accountability. Domestic economic policy, taxation, labor-market regulation, industrial strategy, and public administration are shaped by local conditions and institutional choices. Regional cooperation can support coordination in these areas while leaving decision-making with member states.

Other functions benefit from stronger alignment. Common standards, compatible regulations, shared protocols, and interoperable systems can reduce friction across cybersecurity, logistics, emergency communication, critical infrastructure protection, and cross-border digital services. National institutions remain distinct, but they are better able to operate together.

Where fragmentation creates wider regional risk, deeper forms of cooperation may be needed. Shared situational awareness, maritime monitoring, missile and drone warning, cyber incident coordination, strategic continuity planning, and selected crisis-response capabilities may depend on common platforms or jointly supported mechanisms. Regional capability can give national institutions access to

information, scale, and coordination that would be difficult to generate independently.

The appropriate level of cooperation should reflect four considerations: the scale of the risk, the cost of fragmentation, the speed of response required, and the political sensitivity of the function. These factors can guide the choice between consultation, harmonization, interoperability, shared platforms, joint operational functions, and selective pooling. The result is a flexible regional architecture built around clear mandates, distributed responsibilities, transparent decision rules, and bounded functions.

The GCC as a Regional Intelligence System

Regional architecture requires more than coordination among institutions. It depends on a collective capacity to read changing conditions, interpret emerging risks, organize timely responses, retain lessons, and adjust regional arrangements as circumstances change. This is the basis for viewing the GCC as a regional intelligence system, a concept developed more fully in the companion UNU-CRIS working paper, *The GCC as a Regional Operating System: Differentiated Sovereignty and the Future of Gulf Regionalism to 2030* (Alotaibi, 2026).⁵

Here, regional intelligence describes a distributed capability

⁵ The regional intelligence-system concept also draws on systems-of-systems thinking and the organisation of distributed capabilities across interconnected institutions. See Maier (1998).

Function	Recommended Form	Illustrative Application
Domestic economic policy	National control	Industrial strategy, taxation, labour policy
Regulatory coordination	Harmonization	Technical standards and cross-border procedures
Cybersecurity	Interoperability and shared platforms	Incident notification and information exchange
Maritime security	Shared situational awareness	Common operating pictures and corridor monitoring
Critical infrastructure	Coordinated resilience	Continuity planning and mutual-support arrangements
Crisis response	Joint operational protocols	Notification, escalation, and emergency coordination
Strategic warning	Selective shared capability	Missile and drone warning mechanisms

Table 1: Matching Regional Functions to Institutional Forms

SPECTRUM OF REGIONAL COOPERATION: STAGES & DECISION CRITERIA




Figure 3. Differentiated Sovereignty: Matching Functions to the Right Scale

built around five functions: sensing, processing, coordination, memory, and adaptation. Together, they allow member states to respond more effectively to challenges that cross national boundaries.

Sensing is the ability to detect changes across the regional environment. Maritime activity, missile and drone threats, cyber incidents, infrastructure disruption, supply-chain pressures, and technological dependencies may acquire regional significance before their full effects become visible. Shared reporting standards, interoperable monitoring systems, and common operating pictures can reduce blind spots and improve early awareness.

Processing turns information into usable understanding. Member states may interpret the same event from different institutional and strategic perspectives. Standing analytical mechanisms can compare assessments, identify areas of agreement and divergence, and build a fuller picture of regional risk while preserving national judgement.

Coordination connects awareness to action. Pre-agreed notification procedures, escalation pathways, crisis protocols, and technical interfaces can reduce delay during fast-moving events. Effective coordination depends on clarity about how information moves, which institutions are activated, and how national decisions interact across borders.

Memory allows the region to retain lessons from crises, exercises, and earlier cooperation. After-action reviews, shared repositories, recurring strategic assessments, and

institutional continuity can prevent knowledge from being lost as personnel, priorities, or political conditions change.

Adaptation turns experience into institutional improvement. Procedures, standards, operating assumptions, and coordination mechanisms should be revised when exercises or real events expose weaknesses. Regional capability grows when lessons lead to changes in how the system operates.

These five functions provide a practical test for GCC cooperation: whether member states can detect risks earlier, interpret them more accurately, coordinate more effectively, retain what they learn, and adjust their arrangements over time. Stronger performance across these functions would make the region more resilient while preserving national authority.

Building the Shared Shield

The Shared Shield translates differentiated sovereignty and regional intelligence into practical capability. It should operate as a distributed architecture that connects national systems where shared exposure requires closer coordination, while leaving authority over policy, assets, and operational decisions with member states. Its design should focus on a limited number of priority functions.




Figure 4. The GCC as a Regional Intelligence System

Shared Situational Awareness

Member states need a fuller and more timely view of regional conditions. Interoperable reporting systems, common data standards, and shared operating pictures can improve awareness across maritime security, missile and drone warning, cyber incidents, critical infrastructure, and logistics continuity. Better visibility would reduce blind spots and support faster, better-informed national decisions.

Strategic Assessment

Shared information should be supported by standing mechanisms for joint analysis. Member states may interpret the same event differently, and these differences can be valuable when examined systematically. Comparing national assessments, identifying common risks, and clarifying areas of divergence can produce a stronger regional picture while preserving independent judgment.

Crisis Coordination

The GCC should establish clear procedures for connecting information to action during fast-moving events. Pre-agreed notification rules, escalation pathways, crisis protocols, and designated contact points can reduce delay and uncertainty. These arrangements should clarify how institutions communicate, when coordination is activated, and how national decisions interact across borders.

Critical Infrastructure Resilience

The region should identify systems whose disruption could affect several member states. These include maritime corridors, ports, energy infrastructure, telecommunications, cloud services, payment systems, logistics networks, and selected digital platforms. Regional continuity planning, common resilience standards, mutual-support arrangements, and greater redundancy can reduce the risk of cascading disruption.

Interoperability

National systems should be able to work together effectively. Shared standards, compatible technologies, common procedures, and tested interfaces can support cooperation across cybersecurity, emergency communication, logistics, infrastructure protection, and selected security functions while allowing institutions to remain distinct.

Joint Preparedness and Learning

Regional capability should be tested regularly through joint exercises, simulations, and after-action reviews. These activities can expose weaknesses before they become operational failures and provide a basis for revising procedures, standards, and assumptions. Over time, they would help the regional system improve through experience.




Figure 5. A Phased Pathway to Regional Capability

Trust-Building Safeguards

Deeper cooperation will remain politically viable only when shared capabilities are supported by credible safeguards.⁶ Regional mechanisms should have bounded mandates, transparent decision rules, distributed responsibilities, auditable processes, and clear protections for national authority. Sensitive information should be shared for agreed purposes and remain subject to regular review.

The Shared Shield would bring these functions together as a connected system of national capabilities. Its effectiveness should be judged by member states' abilities to gain earlier warning, coordinate more quickly, preserve continuity under pressure, and improve their arrangements through experience.

A Phased Pathway to Implementation

The Shared Shield should be developed in stages, beginning with areas where cooperation can produce visible value without creating unnecessary political or institutional risk. Early progress should build confidence, test practical arrangements, and provide a basis for deeper cooperation where experience shows that regional mechanisms are useful and sustainable.⁷

⁶ See Ostrom (2005) and Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) on institutional diversity, distributed governance, accountability, and adaptive cooperation.

⁷ This sequencing approach is informed by experimentalist governance, in which cooperation develops through iterative implementation, review, and adaptation. See Sabel and Zeitlin (2008).

Phase I: Bounded Functional Cooperation

The first phase should focus on clearly defined areas where the benefits of cooperation are immediate and the political sensitivities are limited. Priorities may include maritime information exchange, cyber incident classification and notification, logistics continuity mapping, and common resilience standards for selected critical infrastructure. These initiatives should remain technically focused, operate through distributed national nodes, and have clearly defined mandates. Their purpose is to improve regional awareness and establish reliable working relationships without changing national authority.

Phase II: Interoperability and Shared Operating Layers

Once the initial mechanisms have demonstrated value, the GCC should develop the standards, protocols, and technical interfaces needed to connect national systems more effectively. Common data formats, shared operating pictures, regional dashboards, notification procedures, and compatible crisis-response protocols could form this shared operating layer. National systems would continue to serve their own institutions while becoming better connected across the region. The priority at this stage is practical interoperability: ensuring that information can move quickly, systems can communicate, and institutions can coordinate when needed.

Phase III: Strategic Resilience and Joint Functions

The third phase should extend cooperation into areas where fragmentation continues to create significant regional vulnerability. Possible priorities include coordinated continuity planning, regional redundancy arrangements, joint exercises, and selected operational functions in maritime security, cybersecurity, infrastructure protection, and emergency response. Expansion into these areas should follow demonstrated success in the earlier phases and be supported by clear decision rights, defined responsibilities, and credible safeguards against excessive concentration.

Phase IV: Regional Learning and Adaptive Architecture

The final phase should embed learning into the regional system. Shared mechanisms should be reviewed regularly, lessons from exercises and crises should be retained, and procedures should be updated when weaknesses become visible. This would allow regional arrangements to evolve as technologies, risks, and patterns of interdependence change. Progress across the four phases should depend on demonstrated capability and political confidence rather than predetermined institutional targets. Each stage should show that cooperation improves resilience, strengthens national capability, and remains consistent with agreed safeguards.

Policy Recommendations

- 1. Adopt a Functional Approach to GCC Cooperation.** The GCC should assess regional cooperation function by function. Each domain should be examined according to the scale of the risk, the cost of fragmentation, the speed of response required, and the political sensitivity involved. This would provide a clearer basis for deciding if cooperation should take the form of consultation, harmonization, interoperability, shared platforms, joint functions, or selective pooling.
- 2. Introduce Capability-Based Measures of Regional Progress.** Progress should be assessed through the capabilities regional cooperation creates. Can member states detect risks earlier, exchange information more effectively, coordinate responses more quickly, maintain continuity during disruption, and adapt in response to experience? Assessment should be organized around the five functions of regional intelligence: sensing, processing, coordination, memory, and adaptation. This would shift attention away from the number of agreements, meetings, or institutions created and towards the practical value produced by regional cooperation.
- 3. Establish a GCC Regional Strategic Coordination Mechanism.** The GCC should establish a standing mechanism for shared situational awareness, strategic assessment, and crisis coordination across priority domains. It should connect relevant national institutions, support common operating pictures, compare national assessments, coordinate notification and escalation procedures, and maintain a continuous regional view of shared risks. The mechanism should begin with a limited mandate focused on areas where the need for regional coordination is already clear, including maritime security,

Priority Action	Lead Responsibility	Expected Output
Develop a functional map of GCC cooperation	GCC Secretariat General, with member states	Functional cooperation map
Introduce capability-based assessment	GCC Secretariat General, supported by relevant sectoral bodies	Regional capability scorecard
Establish a regional strategic coordination mechanism	GCC Secretariat General and designated national institutions	Standing regional coordination mechanism
Develop interoperability standards	Relevant GCC sectoral committees and national technical authorities	Common protocol and interoperability suite
Institutionalise regional exercises and learning	GCC Secretariat General, sectoral committees, and participating national authorities	Annual preparedness and learning cycle

Table 2: Priority Actions, Institutional Responsibility, and Expected Outputs

cyber incidents, critical infrastructure continuity, and logistics disruption.

4. **Develop Regional Interoperability Standards.** The GCC should develop common technical and operational standards that allow national systems to work together effectively. Priority areas should include cybersecurity information exchange, emergency communication, maritime awareness, critical infrastructure protection, logistics continuity, and cross-border crisis response. Common data formats, secure communication protocols, compatible operating procedures, and agreed technical interfaces should be tested through regular exercises. Interoperability should be treated as a strategic capability in its own right.⁸
5. **Institutionalise Joint Preparedness, Review, and Learning.** The GCC Secretariat General, working with relevant sectoral committees and national authorities, should establish a recurring regional program of exercises, simulations, after-action reviews, and implementation follow-up. The program should operate through an annual cycle. Each cycle should identify priority risks, test decision pathways and institutional interfaces, document weaknesses, assign corrective actions, and review implementation. Exercises should examine communication channels, information-sharing arrangements, escalation procedures, continuity plans, and cross-border coordination. Lessons should be retained through a standing regional knowledge mechanism and translated into revised protocols, technical standards, institutional arrangements, and future exercise priorities. Repeated weaknesses should remain under review until corrective measures are completed.

Key Actions

- Adopt Separate Markets, Shared Shield as a guiding principle for GCC cooperation, distinguishing between functions that should remain nationally controlled and those that require stronger regional capability.
- Apply a functional test to identify where fragmentation creates regional vulnerability and where coordination, interoperability, shared platforms, or selective pooling would improve collective resilience.
- Establish standing regional mechanisms for shared situational awareness, strategic assessment, crisis coordination, and continuity planning across priority domains.

- Develop common standards, protocols, and technical interfaces for cybersecurity, maritime security, critical infrastructure, logistics, and emergency response while preserving national command and decision rights.
- Institutionalize regional learning through joint exercises, after-action reviews, shared lessons, and regular adaptation of procedures, and assess progress through improvements in capability, resilience, interoperability, and response rather than institutional growth alone.

Conclusion

The Gulf already operates as a shared strategic environment. Maritime routes, digital systems, energy infrastructure, logistics networks, cyber risks, and emerging technologies increasingly connect the security and resilience of GCC member states. Regional capability now needs to develop at the same pace as this growing interdependence. Separate Markets, Shared Shield provides a practical basis for doing so. It preserves national diversity in areas where different development models and policy choices remain valuable, while strengthening regional capability where fragmented action creates wider risk. Differentiated sovereignty guides how functions are allocated across national and regional levels, and the regional intelligence system provides the means to sense change, assess risk, coordinate action, retain lessons, and adapt.

Progress should be gradual, focused on specific functions, and supported by clear safeguards. Its value should be judged through practical outcomes: earlier warning, faster coordination, stronger continuity under pressure, and the ability to improve through shared experience. The first real test will be whether the GCC builds one or two standing regional capabilities in clearly defined domains, demonstrates that they are useful and politically trusted, and then uses that experience to deepen cooperation where fragmentation has become strategically costly. Recent developments also suggest that some strategic capabilities may increasingly be developed through wider partnerships beyond the GCC, making the next challenge one of connecting national, GCC, and external capabilities without weakening regional coherence or national authority.

Source Publication: This policy brief draws on the author's UNU-CRIS Working Paper: The GCC as a Regional Operating System: Differentiated Sovereignty and the Future of Gulf Regionalism to 2030.

⁸ See Maier (1998) on systems-of-systems architecture and GCC regional initiatives supporting shared cybersecurity information and coordination (Supreme Council of the GCC, 2024).

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