

General Assembly Engagement on Peace and Security in the 80th Session

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Introduction

Although the United Nations Charter vests primary responsibility for peace and security with the Security Council, it grants the General Assembly broad powers and responsibility to consider and make recommendations on any issues within the scope of the Charter. Drawing on this authority, the General Assembly has engaged with a wide range of peace and security matters, deploying mediators to contribute to conflict resolution, mandating the establishment of peace operations or other operational bodies, recommending measures in response to uses of force or sanctions, and creating or supporting accountability mechanisms, among other actions. However, much of this practice is relatively unknown, leading to limited understanding of the potential courses of action available to the Assembly.

In its 77th session, the General Assembly recognized the role of the Assembly in the maintenance of peace and security and the need to foster interaction with the Security Council on these matters ([A/RES/77/335](#)). To support this, the Assembly requested the President of the General Assembly to provide “a digital handbook or accessible outlines on past practices, data and recommendations” (ibid., para. 30). In August 2024, the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research produced this Digital Handbook on behalf of the Office of the President of the General Assembly: [Assembly for Peace: a digital handbook on the UN General Assembly's past practice on peace and security](#). In response to subsequent encouragement by the General Assembly in its 79th session for annual updating and wider dissemination ([A/RES/79/327](#), para. 12), the digital handbook was converted in 2026 into a [website](#) incorporating all original material and additional updates. This research brief also responds to the request for annual updates by summarizing key resolutions and processes related to the maintenance of peace and security in the Assembly's 80th session.

The *Assembly for Peace* Handbook, as published in 2024, provided illustrations of past practice clustered into five areas: General Assembly engagement with [peace operations](#), [responses to uses of force](#), recommendations with regard to [sanctions](#), support for [accountability mechanisms and initiatives](#), and support for [good offices](#).¹ The Handbook also covered procedural developments and practice associated with the [Uniting for Peace](#) (UFP) resolution and the 2022 [Veto Initiative](#) ([A/RES/76/262](#)). Each of these areas of practice were supported with [cases of practice](#), abbreviated case studies summarizing General Assembly action (for example, adoption of resolutions) in response to peace and security issues. This brief follows a similar pattern, identifying resolutions adopted within the 80th session, or other General Assembly engagement, that align with these five [areas of practice](#). Some are described more fully in cases of practice in [Annex 2](#).

The *Assembly for Peace* Handbook was designed to be accessible and user-friendly, with a streamlined main text hyperlinked to the cases of practice or other sources of further information. All United Nations resolutions and documents were hyperlinked to the original source material. This document adopts a similar style, hyperlinking the text to all cited United Nations sources and resolutions. Where relevant the text also links to the summaries of practice and case studies that appeared in the original Handbook or in subsequent update publications via hyperlinks to these sections within the [Assembly for Peace](#) web platform. In keeping with the style adopted in the *Assembly for Peace* Handbook, for brevity, United Nations (UN), General Assembly (GA) and Security Council (SC) will be abbreviated hereinafter. Where historical situations are discussed, the country names appear as they were recognized by the GA at the time of the issue or resolution under discussion, which may differ from the present spelling or accepted names. Also, as with the original Handbook, the work of the [six main GA committees](#) is not the focus. However, some resolutions (primarily recurring resolutions) noted in this report arose on the report of one of the six main GA committees.

¹ Each of these terms and [areas of practice](#) are further defined in the [Assembly for Peace Handbook](#). For example, the chapter on “[good offices](#)” describes these as ranging from processes of dialogue and negotiation to “a well-timed phone call by the Secretary-General”. These can include appointment of mediators or committees that can undertake diplomatic engagement to convening diplomatic or intergovernmental processes that create space for political processes.

United Nations Charter basis and legal background

While the UN Charter vests primary responsibility for peace and security in the SC, it also creates a clear role and joint responsibilities for the GA. [Article 10](#) authorizes the GA to discuss or make recommendations on “any matters within the scope of the present Charter”. [Article 11](#) empowers the GA to “discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security” and to “make recommendations” on them. [Article 14](#) further authorizes the GA to “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation”.

The Charter also creates an additional accountability role for the GA vis-à-vis the SC on matters related to peace and security. [Article 11\(1\)](#) explicitly provides that the GA may make recommendations to the SC with respect to the maintenance of peace and security, and [Article 11\(3\)](#) notes that “the General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security”. The GA has frequently relied on these powers to call issues to the SC’s attention, suggest greater attention to a peace and security matters or alternate courses of action.

There are limitations on the GA’s powers. [Article 12](#) of the UN Charter was initially interpreted as restricting the GA from taking up matters already being considered by the SC; however, over time, consideration of matters by the SC and GA in parallel has become “accepted practice” and deemed consistent with the UN Charter by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).² Nonetheless, the ICJ has observed that the GA should still refer matters that require coercive or mandatory effect back to the SC.³ This is because, while the GA may make recommendations on any matter, its recommendations are not binding. The ICJ clarified that this does not mean that the GA’s powers are “confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations”, but can “have dispositive force and effect”.⁴ For example, throughout its history, the GA has relied on [Article 22](#) of the UN Charter – which empowers the GA to establish “such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions” – to create mechanisms or bodies that can take forward action, including establishing peace operations or other operational bodies, commissions of inquiry, reconciliation committees or other conflict management or resolution mechanisms.⁵ Further discussion of the above Charter powers and legal interpretations, and ICJ rulings on them, are available in the [Assembly for Peace Handbook](#).

While most of the GA’s engagement with peace and security matters occurs during its regular sessions, some GA resolutions related to peace and security issues have been passed during special sessions or within emergency special sessions reconvened in connection with the [UFP](#) resolution from 1950 ([A/RES/377\(V\)](#)). The UFP resolution created a special procedure to facilitate prompt (within 24 hours) GA consideration when there is a veto or threat of veto in the SC over a peace and security matter. The UFP does not create any additional powers; any GA resolutions adopted in emergency special sessions relies on the Charter-based powers outlined above. However, activation of the UFP resolution often provides an additional degree of impetus and political expediency that may facilitate action on ongoing conflict and crisis situations over which the SC is deadlocked. Beginning with the [7th emergency special session](#), on the “Question of Palestine”, the GA established the precedent that these sessions can be adjourned and reconvened on the request of Member States. A new instance of a veto or threat of a veto is not required to reconvene a session, although this has served regularly as the impetus.

² [A/ES-10/273](#), paras. 27, 28.

³ *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, p. 164.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Because the GA cannot authorize mandatory action where these subsidiary bodies, for example peace operations, deploy on another State’s territory, they must do so with its consent. ICJ, *Certain Expenses*, p. 164.

General Assembly engagement on peace and security matters in the 80th session

In the 80th session, much of the GA's engagement with peace and security related to a series of processes and intergovernmental deliberations, either the future UN architecture and leadership (the selection process for the next Secretary-General, the UN80 initiative), seeing through commitments of prior intergovernmental processes (the *Pact for the Future*) or other system review processes (the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, the review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy). Each of these is briefly described below and some hyperlink to case studies in the Annex:

- **2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review:** Since the establishment of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) in 2005 – which comprises the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) – every five years Member States have conducted a review known as the Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR). This was mandated in the same resolutions that created the PBA ([A/RES/60/180](#); [S/RES/1645](#)). Last year (2025) was the fourth such PBAR, with the formal outcomes of the PBAR and two identical resolutions considered by the SC and the GA adopted in the 80th session ([A/RES/80/11](#); [S/RES/2805](#)). Notable provisions included an emphasis on strengthening system-wide coordination, of linking peacebuilding efforts and entities (both UN and non-UN) with the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to a greater extent, on identifying more sustainable peacebuilding financing (including through cooperation with international financial institutions and regional development banks), and institutionalizing the norms of conflict prevention within peacebuilding, including through encouraging nationally-owned prevention and peacebuilding strategies. The 2025 PBAR resolutions also called for the organization of an annual “Peacebuilding Week” (*ibid.*, para 12). The first Peacebuilding Week was held in June 2026 in New York, with Member States co-organizing main events and side events.
- **Selection of the next Secretary-General:** On 25 November 2025, the President of the GA (PGA) for its 80th session, Annalena Baerbock, presented a [joint letter](#) with the President of the SC that formally initiated the selection process for the next Secretary-General.⁶ During the 80th session, the Assembly conducted public “interactive dialogues” with candidates, giving all 193 Member States and civil society representatives the opportunity to interview candidates, as well as one “town hall” in July 2026.
- ***Pact for the Future* follow-up:** At its 79th session, the GA adopted the *Pact for the Future* and its annexes ([A/RES/79/1](#)). The [Pact for the Future](#) was the culmination of a multi-year intergovernmental process through which Member States made collective commitments about ways to respond to profound changes in the global environment. The Pact contains a dedicated chapter (chapter II) on international peace and security ([A/RES/79/1](#), paras. 32-48) and a separate chapter on global governance, with an emphasis on the role of the GA and its relationship with the SC (*ibid.*, Actions 41, 42). In the 80th session, Member States took forward many of the Pact's provisions. Specific to peace and security provisions, Member States continued to engage on the issues related to the Pact's mandated system-wide review of all forms of UN peace operations, although it was in preparation during most of the 80th session (*ibid.*, para. 42(b)). In keeping with commitments under Action 41 of the Pact, several Member States circulated a draft resolution related to encouraging greater adherence to [Article 27\(3\)](#), which provides that “in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain

⁶ The process for selecting the next Secretary-General was set out in resolution 79/327 ([S/RES/79/327](#)). Subsequent to this letter, the PGA and the President of the SC circulated a joint letter announcing official candidacies and jointly maintained and regularly updated a public list of candidates, including the name, nominating State(s), vision statement, curriculum vitae and campaign financing disclosures, published on a dedicated UN webpage.

from voting” in the SC, which has not been tabled during the 80th session. Some commitments under the *Pact for the Future* (particularly, Action 44) are reflected in the 2025 PBAR as well.

- **UN80 Initiative:** In March 2025, at the UN’s 80th anniversary Secretary-General António Guterres announced the “UN80 initiative”, a series of reviews, reforms and restructuring designed to make the UN system more effective and efficient. It was spurred in part by financial pressures and a liquidity crisis at the UN, but was also partly inspired by the principles in the *Pact for the Future*. In the 79th session, the GA adopted resolution 79/318 welcoming the UN80 initiative ([A/RES/79/318](#)). Throughout the 80th session, Member States were active in several of the announced workstreams intended to guide the initiative, including reviewing budgetary proposals, mandates, and other proposed restructuring. Some parts of the UN peace and security architecture were also restructured (with the approval of the GA) in the 80th session, including the merger of the PBSO with some of the units previously organized under the United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions to form the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office.
- **Ninth Review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy:** In July 2026, following Counter-Terrorism Week (a week of events organized by Member States and others),⁷ the GA adopted resolution 80/286, signifying its ninth review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ([A/RES/80/286](#)).⁸ This marked the 20th anniversary of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the first time the Review was not adopted by consensus since its inception in 2006.

Resolutions adopted in relation to specific peace and security matters

In addition to these intergovernmental processes and reviews, the GA engaged substantively with several ongoing peace and security matters. In recent sessions, one of the most active arenas for GA engagement on peace and security matters was through resolutions adopted in the reconvened [10th emergency special session](#) and the [11th emergency special session](#). In the 80th session, the GA adopted two resolutions in reconvened sessions of the [11th emergency special session](#) related to the conflict in Ukraine, one adopted on 3 December related to “Return of Ukrainian children” ([A/RES/ES-11/9](#)) and one adopted on the fourth anniversary of the start of the conflict, in February, that renewed calls for an “immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire” for the exchange of prisoners of war, and other confidence-building measures ([A/RES/ES-11/10](#), paras. 1-3).

The 10th emergency special session was not resumed during the 80th session, although the GA did adopt resolutions in regular session that followed up on matters previously considered within it. For example, the GA took forward the [High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the two-State Solution](#), which was first proposed in a resolution adopted as part of the 10th emergency special session ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#)).⁹ The Conference represented an example of the GA using its convening power to facilitate [good offices](#) and conflict resolution on a particular peace and security matter.

Also related to some of the subject matter of the 10th emergency special session, the GA passed a resolution in response to the [ICJ’s advisory opinion](#) on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the UN, other international organizations and third States. The opinion had been requested by the Assembly during the 79th session ([A/RES/79/232](#)), after the Israeli Knesset adopted laws barring operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), stripping its privileges and immunities, and prohibiting Israeli authorities

⁷ Events are co-organized by Member States, United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities, international and regional organizations, academia, civil society and the private sector. This was the fourth Counter-Terrorism Week for this framework. Further information is available at: <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/en/united-nations-global-counter-terrorism-strategy-living-framework-global-action>. See also [A/80/620](#).

⁸ The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was established on 8 September 2006, when it was adopted by consensus through UN GA Resolution 60/288 ([A/RES/60/288](#)). It included collective commitments on counter-terrorism and a plan of action.

⁹ Although first proposed in resolution ES-10/24, the plan for this Conference was addressed more fully in a subsequent resolution ([A/RES/79/81](#)).

from having contact with UNRWA staff.¹⁰ The ICJ's October 2025 advisory opinion found that Israel was obliged to facilitate (and not impede) relief schemes to distribute essential supplies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), including by UNRWA.¹¹ Further, the Court found that Israel has an obligation to cooperate in good faith with the UN, including UNRWA, and to ensure full respect for the privileges and immunities accorded to the UN and its bodies.¹² The GA welcomed the ruling and affirmed its findings in December 2025 ([A/RES/80/116](#), paras. 1, 3-4). In the same resolution, it urged States, regional organizations and UN bodies to "continue and expedite the provision of ... assistance to the Palestinian people" and to "ensure full implementation of the advisory opinion" (*ibid.*, para. 6). Toward that end, in June 2026, the PGA chaired a Pledging Conference for UNRWA to increase financial and political support for the agency.¹³

Another illustration of the GA's convening power in relation to ongoing peace and security issues was the [High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar](#), convened by the GA in September 2025 following its proposal in the 79th session ([A/RES/79/182](#), para. 36). The Conference produced a summary document with recommendations for how to address the root causes of the crisis, address humanitarian issues, and create a conducive environment for the return of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities, with a view to reaching a sustainable resolution of the crisis.¹⁴

The GA also continued to pass new versions of recurring resolutions that touched on peace and security issues, including as relates to the human rights situation in a number of areas;¹⁵ an annual recurring resolution related to the [Kimberley Process](#) ([A/RES/80/252](#)); on the use of mercenaries ([A/RES/80/194](#)); the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination ([A/RES/80/195](#)); and measures to eliminate international terrorism ([A/RES/80/171](#)).

Conclusions

Overall, the greater focus of the 80th session in terms of its engagement with peace and security was on system processes, reviews and reforms, rather than engaging in specific country matters or conflict resolution efforts.¹⁶ The two high-level conferences organized (on a two-State solution to the question of Palestine and on the situation of Rohingya Muslims) illustrate the potential scope of the GA's convening power, which can create space for political processes and diplomatic engagement. However, both were largely on the initiative of resolutions adopted in the 79th session, rather than on new action or initiative taken in the 80th session. Similarly, the two resolutions adopted welcoming two recent ICJ advisory opinions reinforce the Assembly's commitment to accountability measures and to efforts to reinforce international law, but both advisory opinions were requested by the GA in prior sessions ([A/RES/77/276](#); [A/RES/79/232](#)).

Following SC vetoes of draft resolutions related to the situation in Gaza ([S/2025/583](#)) and threats to free passage in the Strait of Hormuz ([S/2026/273](#)), the GA held debates on both matters, in accordance with the [Veto Initiative](#)

¹⁰ United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "Bureau Calls Knesset's Decision to Ban Palestinian Refugee Agency 'Unlawful as the Occupation Itself'", 21 October 2024.

¹¹ *Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, I.C.J. Reports 2025. Available at <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/196>.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, "UNRWA Pledging Conference – 30 June 2026". Available at https://www.unrwa.org/pledging_conference_june2026.

¹⁴ United Nations, "Summary of the High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar", 30 September 2025. Available at https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/110/2025/11/Summary_High-level-Conference-on-the-Situation-of-Rohingya-Muslims-and-Other-Minorities-in-Myanmar.pdf.

¹⁵ Examples of these recurring resolutions passed in the 80th session include: disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation ([A/RES/80/24](#); [A/RES/80/45](#); [A/RES/80/48](#)), as well as the human rights situation in Iran ([A/RES/80/222](#)), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ([A/RES/80/220](#)) and occupied areas of Ukraine ([A/RES/80/223](#)).

¹⁶ The 79th session had substantial engagement with conflict dynamics in Israel and the OPT and in Ukraine, both through the 10th and 11th emergency special sessions as well as in other resolutions adopted in regular sessions.

([A/RES/76/262](#)). During both debates, many Member States expressed dissatisfaction with the vetoes, with some characterizing the first veto as a symptom of the “paralysis of the Security Council when it comes to achieving a ceasefire in Gaza”¹⁷ and the latter as a “missed opportunity to address threats to international peace and security” and to ensure protection of maritime routes.¹⁸ During that debate, the PGA further underlined the GA’s responsibility to step forward where the SC was unable or unwilling to fulfil its Charter responsibilities, and encouraged Member States “to put forward concrete, forward-looking solutions, including draft resolutions, that help move beyond the current impasse, not only with regard to the Strait of Hormuz, but across the region as a whole”.¹⁹

There were also a number of recommendations or action points inferable from these debates. In the first veto debate many delegations emphasized the key provisions of the vetoed draft resolution, including demanding an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages and the lifting of restrictions on the distribution of humanitarian assistance.²⁰ The informal summary of the Office of the President of the General Assembly (OPGA) on the veto debate²¹ surrounding the conflict and blockages in and around the Strait of Hormuz also contained a number of potential action points, either referenced in delegations’ statements or inferable from the collective debate. These included encouraging all parties to consolidate and sustain the ceasefire, and to exercise maximum restraint, encouraging compliance with international law and for the Secretary-General’s good offices to be deployed, including through envoys and coordination mechanisms.²² Whether calling for a cessation of hostilities, authorizing or calling for deconfliction and coordination mechanisms, facilitating and requesting that the Secretary-General deploy good offices, or directly appointing mediators and Member State contact groups, these are all actions that the GA has adopted resolutions to support. The “missed opportunity” in this situation may not only have been SC inaction but the GA’s failure to take forward its proposals through adoption of a subsequent resolution.

Beyond the matters that were the subject of SC vetoes or of open emergency special sessions, there were other significant disturbances to the maintenance of peace and security during the 80th session, including United States military intervention and apprehension of the sitting President in Venezuela, a significant escalation in hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan, continued internationalized civil war in Sudan, and renewed extremist threats in the Sahel region, including in Mali and Burkina Faso. While many of these issues were on the SC agenda, for most no SC resolution was passed, and the GA did not step in to take these issues up. A wider range of issues was covered within the work of the GA’s committees, and in the numerous recurring resolutions that came out of those committees. However, while recurring resolutions formally keep issues on the agenda, the recurring nature (often with the same provisions repeated over decades) does not tend to galvanize the level of public and political attention needed to spur new conflict resolution efforts or other means of shaping the peace and security issues in question.

Overall, the record of the 80th session highlights the important role that the GA can play in the maintenance of peace and security, in particular its role in reviewing and suggesting revisions on key parts of the UN architecture. Building from this, and from the longer legacy of GA engagement on peace and security historically (which the [Assembly for Peace Handbook](#) highlights) is something that the 81st session or other future GA sessions could yet take up.

¹⁷ United Nations, Office of the President of the General Assembly, “[Summary of the 15th plenary meeting of the General Assembly during its 80th session under agenda item 64 entitled ‘Use of the veto’](#): Special report on the Security Council (A/80/394)”, 1 October 2025, pp. 1–2.

¹⁸ United Nations, Office of the President of the General Assembly, “[The 79th and 80th plenary meeting of the General Assembly during its 80th session under item 64 entitled ‘use of the veto’](#): Special Report of the Security Council (A/80/707)”, informal summary, 14 April 2026, p. 1.

¹⁹ Annalena Baerbock, “[PGA Remarks at the General Assembly on the use of the veto](#)”, New York, NY, 16 April 2026.

²⁰ United Nations, Office of the President of the General Assembly, “[Summary of the 15th plenary meeting of the General Assembly during its 80th session under agenda item 64 entitled ‘Use of the veto’](#): Special report on the Security Council (A/80/394)”, 1 October 2025, pp. 1–2.

²¹ Resolution 79/327 requested the PGA to develop summaries, “including recommendations” for action, following debates on the veto ([A/RES/79/327](#), para. 6).

²² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Annex 1: The Veto Initiative

On 26 April 2022, the GA passed resolution 76/262 (without a vote), subsequently known as the [Veto Initiative](#), which stipulates that every time a veto is used in the SC, the GA will meet within 10 working days and “hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast, provided that the Assembly does not meet in an emergency special session on the same situation” ([A/RES/76/262](#)).

Permanent members of the SC vetoed two draft resolutions during the 80th session. The first, vetoed by the United States on 18 September 2025, concerned the situation in Gaza ([S/2025/583](#)). The draft resolution would have demanded an “immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire in Gaza” (ibid., para. 1) and recalled the demand for the release of all hostages, and the lifting of restrictions on the distribution of humanitarian assistance (ibid. paras. 2-3). In accordance with the Veto Initiative, the GA held a debate on the veto on 1 October 2025, during which Member States expressed widespread support for the vetoed draft resolution and reiterated the demand for its key provisions. A number of delegations “expressed their disappointment” that a veto had been cast and viewed this as a symptom of the “paralysis of the Security Council when it comes to achieving a ceasefire in Gaza and allowing humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza strip”, according to the informal summary of the PGA on the debate.²³

The second draft resolution, vetoed by China and the Russian Federation on 7 April 2026, concerned maritime security in and near the Strait of Hormuz ([S/2026/273](#)). It condemned “any actions or threats aimed at closing, obstructing, or otherwise interfering with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz” (ibid., preamble) and reaffirmed that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage under international law (ibid., para. 1). It encouraged States to coordinate in “defensive” efforts to ensure safe passage and navigation through the Strait (ibid., paras. 2-3) and demanded that the Islamic Republic of Iran immediately cease all attacks on commercial vessels and any impediment of the Strait (ibid., para. 6). It broadly urged de-escalation in ongoing hostilities in the Gulf and called for a return to diplomacy (ibid., para. 9).

The GA considered the veto on 16 April 2026. During this debate, a “large number of speakers” characterized the vetoed draft as a “missed opportunity to address threats to international peace and security” and to ensure protection of maritime routes.²⁴ Many delegations emphasized the importance of safe navigation for global trade, energy and food security, and called for implementation of SC resolution 2817, which had condemned attacks in the Gulf and broader region by the Islamic Republic of Iran.²⁵ The suggested actions based on the debate, as compiled by the OPGA, included encouraging all parties to consolidate and sustain the ceasefire, calling upon all Member States to respect international law and calling for all parties to exercise maximum restraint.²⁶ An additional action point suggested was to encourage the continued use of the Secretary-General’s good offices, including through envoys and coordination mechanisms.²⁷

One of the key learning points from the *Assembly for Peace Handbook* was that the GA has frequently adopted resolutions authorizing or calling for such measures, including calling for ceasefires or cessation of hostilities, urging parties’ compliance with international law, and urging the Secretary-General’s use of good offices, including through direct

²³ United Nations, Office of the President of the General Assembly, “[Summary of the 15th plenary meeting of the General Assembly during its 80th session under agenda item 64 entitled ‘Use of the veto’](#): Special report on the Security Council (A/80/394)”, 1 October 2025, p. 1-2.

²⁴ United Nations, Office of the President of the General Assembly, “[The 79th and 80th plenary meeting of the General Assembly during its 80th session under item 64 entitled ‘use of the veto’](#): Special Report of the Security Council (A/80/707)”, informal summary, 16 April 2026, p. 1.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

appointment of mediators, commissions and envoys. In this case though, these recommended action points were not followed by a GA resolution. Neither debate resulted in the adoption of a subsequent resolution.

Table of debates held in accordance with General Assembly resolution 76/262 following Security Council vetoes, as of the 80th session

The table below lists the vetoes cast since the adoption of resolution 76/272, and the corresponding GA debate or emergency special session discussion in response. As stipulated in resolution 76/272, where the matter subject to a veto is considered in a subsequent emergency special session, it is not necessary to convene a separate debate under the Veto Initiative. These instances are highlighted gray in the table below.

Beginning in the 77th session, the PGA began to produce an informal summary of the Veto Initiative plenary debate that took place. With resolution 79/327, this practice was formalized, with the GA requesting the PGA to continue to provide these summaries and include “recommendations for action” ([A/RES/79/327](#), para. 6). Links to these summaries are also included in the final column of the table below.

Table 1: Debates held in accordance with General Assembly resolution 76/262

Within this table, the following abbreviations are used: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Emergency Special Session (ESS), General Assembly (GA), Not Applicable (N.A.), People's Republic of China (PRC), President of the General Assembly (PGA), Russian Federation (RF), Security Council (SC), United States (US).

Date of SC consideration	Draft SC resolution and matter	Veto by	GA debate on veto	PGA summary
7 April 2026	S/2026/273 : The situation in the Middle East	PRC, RF	16 April 2026 A/80/PV.79* ; A/80/PV.80*	PGA Summary
18 September 2025	S/2025/583 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	US	1 October 2025 A/80/PV.15* ; A/80/PV.16*	PGA Summary
4 June 2025	S/2025/353 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	US	12 June 2025 Considered in ESS-10: A/ES-10/PV.60*	N.A.
24 February 2025	S/2025/115 / S/2025/116 : Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine - Amendments to the draft resolution S/2025/112	RF	6 March 2025 A/79/PV.60	PGA Summary
20 November 2024	S/2024/835 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	US	4, 11 December 2024 Considered in ESS-10: A/ES-10/PV.57 ; A/ES-10/PV.58* ; A/ES-10/PV.59*	N.A.
18 November 2024	S/2024/826 : Reports of the Secretary-General on Sudan and South Sudan	RF	26 November 2024 A/79/PV.42	PGA Summary
24 April 2024	S/2024/302 : Non-proliferation	RF	6 May 2024 A/78/PV.78 ; A/78/PV.79	PGA Summary
18 April 2024	S/2024/312 : Admission of new members	US	1 May 2024 A/78/PV.74 ; A/78/PV.75	PGA Summary
28 March 2024	S/2024/255 : Non-proliferation – DPRK	RF	11 April 2024 A/78/PV.68 ; A/78/PV.69	PGA Summary

22 March 2024	S/2024/239 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	PRC, RF	8 April 2024 A/78/PV.66 ; A/78/PV.67	PGA Summary
20 February 2024	S/2024/173 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	US	4-5 March 2024 A/78/PV.59 ; A/78/PV.60 ; A/78/PV.61	PGA Summary
22 December 2023	S/2023/1029 (oral amendment) : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	US	9 January 2024 A/78/PV.51 ; A/78/PV.52	PGA Summary
8 December 2023	S/2023/970 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	US	12, 15, 20 December 2023 Considered in ESS-10: A/ES-10/PV.45 ; A/ES-10/PV.46 ; A/ES-10/PV.47 ; A/ES-10/PV.48	N.A.
25 October 2023	S/2023/792 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	PRC, RF	26 October – 2 November 2023 Considered in ESS-10: A/ES-10/PV.39 ; A/ES-10/PV.44	N.A.
18 October 2023	S/2023/773 : The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	US	26 October – 2 November 2023 Considered in ESS-10: A/ES-10/PV.39 ; A/ES-10/PV.44	N.A.
30 August 2023	S/2023/638 : The situation in Mali	RF	11 September 2023 A/78/PV.3	PGA Summary
11 July 2023	S/2023/506 : The situation in the Middle East	RF	19 July 2023 A/77/PV.90 ; A/77/PV.91	PGA Summary
30 September 2022	S/2022/720 : Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine	RF	10, 12 October 2022 Considered in ESS-11: A/ES-11/PV.12 ; A/ES-11/PV.13 ; A/ES-11/PV.14	N.A.
8 July 2022	S/2022/538 : The situation in the Middle East	RF	21 July 2022 A/76/PV.95 ; A/76/PV.96	N.A.
26 May 2022	S/2022/431 : Non-proliferation – DPRK	PRC, RF	8, 10 June 2022 A/76/PV.77 ; A/76/PV.78 ; A/76/PV.81 ; A/76/PV.82	N.A.

* As of the time of publication, the meeting record was not yet available.

Annex 2: Case studies of General Assembly practice

A prominent feature of the *Assembly for Peace Handbook* was the development of 61 [case studies of past practice](#), to make institutional knowledge of past precedents and use of GA powers under the Charter more accessible for Member States and the public. This annex continues that practice by either updating prior case studies that had been developed in the original Handbook or in a follow-on update publication related to developments in the [79th session](#), or introducing new case studies based on new areas of practice in the 80th session.

11th emergency special session: Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (2022–2023)

Background: The [11th emergency special session](#) of the GA was convened following Russian forces' act of "aggression" (as later characterized by the GA ([A/RES/ES-11/1](#))) against Ukraine, beginning on 24 February 2022. After the Russian Federation vetoed a draft SC resolution on the matter ([S/2022/155](#)),²⁸ the 11th emergency special session was convened on 2 March 2022. The GA adopted six resolutions during the 11th emergency special session convenings in 2022. The first of these conveyed the GA's commitment to the "territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders", deplored "aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter" and called on the Russian Federation to withdraw its forces and reverse efforts to change the status of Donetsk and Luhansk ([A/RES/ES-11/1](#), paras. 1, 2, 4, 6). Follow-on resolutions within the same emergency special session called for an immediate halt to attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure ([A/RES/ES-11/2](#)); suspended the membership rights of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council ([A/RES/ES-11/3](#)); condemned the organization of "illegal so-called referendums" in Ukrainian territory ([A/RES/ES-11/4](#)); recognized "that the Russian Federation must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine" and recommended the creation of "an international register of damage" ([A/RES/ES-11/5](#), paras. 2, 3).

The 11th emergency special session was reconvened on 22–23 February 2023, the first anniversary of the hostilities. In the sole resolution adopted, the GA reiterated many of the points of the previous resolutions, including recalling the obligation of States under Article 2 of the UN Charter, reaffirming that "no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal" and deploring the "dire human rights and humanitarian consequences of the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine" ([A/RES/ES-11/6](#), preamble). It also underscored the need to reach a just and lasting peace in line with the principles of the UN Charter, called upon Member States to redouble diplomatic efforts, reaffirmed its commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for full adherence to international humanitarian law principles, among other operative provisions ([A/RES/ES-11/6](#)).

During the 79th session, two resolutions were adopted, one that closely mirrored prior resolutions and one which offered a different framing and approach. A resolution entitled "Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine" was adopted as resolution ES-11/7; it recalled the previous resolutions, noted with concern that the Russian Federation's "full-scale invasion" continued to have "devastating and long-lasting consequences" for Ukraine and the region, and reaffirmed its commitment to the "sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders" ([A/RES/ES-11/7](#)). Also similar to prior resolutions, it emphasized the need to "ensure accountability for the most serious crimes under international law" committed in Ukraine, called on all parties to the

²⁸ In this draft resolution, the SC "deplores in the strongest terms the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter" and "decides that the Russian Federation shall immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine" ([S/2022/155](#), paras. 2, 3).

conflict to fully comply with humanitarian law and to ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access, and urged all Member States to address the global impacts of the war on food security, nuclear security and the environment (ibid., paras. 5, 7, 9). A distinctly different resolution entitled “The path to peace” put forward by the United States was adopted with amendments as resolution ES-11/8. It contained no operative paragraphs but simply reaffirmed the commitment “to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” and implored “a swift end to the conflict and further urges a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation” ([A/RES/ES-11/8](#), paras. 2,3).

GA consideration in the 80th session: During the 80th session, the 11th emergency special session was reconvened twice. It was first reconvened on 3 December 2025, following a request by Ukraine, Canada and the European Union. During the resumed session, the GA adopted resolution ES-11/9, on the “Return of Ukrainian children” ([A/RES/ES-11/9](#)). Framing this issue within international humanitarian law and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the resolution demanded that the Russian Federation ensure the “immediate, safe and unconditional return of all Ukrainian children who have been forcibly transferred or deported” (ibid., para. 1). It also requested the Secretary-General to exercise his good offices, including through the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children and coordinate relevant UN efforts (ibid., para. 3).

The 11th emergency special session was reconvened again on 24 February 2026, the fourth anniversary of the Russian Federation’s “full-scale invasion” of Ukraine ([A/RES/ES-11/10](#)). The GA adopted a resolution on the “Support for lasting peace in Ukraine”, which called for an “immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire” between the Russian Federation and Ukraine (ibid., para. 1) and renewed calls for “the complete exchange of prisoners of war, the release of all unlawfully detained persons, and the return of all internees and civilians forcibly transferred or deported, including children, as a significant confidence-building measure” (ibid., para. 3).

At the time of writing, the 11th emergency special session remains open and can be resumed at any time at the request of Member States.

High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution

Background: The question of a two-State solution, and according recognition for a Palestinian State, have been part of GA considerations since the GA first addressed the Palestinian question in 1947. Resolution 181(II) of 1947 envisioned independent Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and stipulated that “when the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective ... sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the UN” ([A/RES/181\(II\)](#), Part I, Chapter 4 (F)). The “Partition Plan” proposed in resolution 181(II) was not accepted by the parties and was immediately overtaken by the change in situation following the first Arab-Israeli war. However, the GA remained continuously engaged in trying to support good offices and diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict over the subsequent seven decades, in particular to ensure Palestinian representation at the UN and to keep the idea of a two-State solution on the agenda.²⁹ This has included appointing the first UN mediator or envoy on the issue in 1948 ([A/RES/186 \(S-2\)](#)), establishing committees that could contribute to mediation of the conflict ([A/RES/194\(III\)](#); [A/RES/3376\(XXX\)](#)), calling for or supporting conferences related to Middle East peace talks ([A/RES/31/62](#)

²⁹ Examples of these issues being raised in earlier GA resolutions include: [A/RES/3375 \(XXXX\)](#); [A/RES/3237 \(XXIX\)](#). Since 1996 ([A/RES/51/26](#)), the GA has passed an annual resolution titled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine”, nearly all of which reference or explicitly lend support to a two-State solution. See, for example, [A/RES/64/19](#) (2009), para. 18; [A/RES/77/25](#) (2022), para. 1; [A/RES/79/81](#) (2024), para. 1.

(1976); [A/RES/38/58](#)[C], para. 3; [A/RES/48/58](#)) and authorizing a UN Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories to facilitate further talks ([SG/A/585/SG/SM/5298](#)).

In September 2024, the GA adopted resolution ES-10/24, which primarily focused on welcoming and responding to the [ICJ's advisory opinion on the legal consequences of policies and practices in the OPT and East Jerusalem](#), but also included a proposal to convene an international conference on “the implementation of the United Nations resolutions pertaining to the question of Palestine and the two-State solution for the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East” ([A/RES/ES-10/24](#), para. 13). A more concrete proposal for a conference within 2025 was highlighted in a subsequent resolution in the 79th session,³⁰ which welcomed the announcement of a “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the two-State Solution, to be held in June 2025” and included modalities of the Conference in the annex ([A/RES/79/81](#), para. 2, annex).

The Conference, which was held at the GA in New York from 28 to 30 July 2025, resulted in an outcome document signed by the two co-chairs of the Conference (France and Saudi Arabia) and relevant working groups, entitled the *New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution* (“New York Declaration”, [A/CONF.243/2025/1](#)). Signatories of the New York Declaration “committed to taking tangible, timebound, and irreversible steps for the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine and the implementation of the Two-State solution” (ibid., para. 6).³¹

GA consideration in the 80th session: Early in the 80th session, on 12 September 2025, the GA endorsed the New York Declaration (A/80/L.1/Rev.1, 142-10-12). Shortly after this on 22 September, during High-Level Week, the Conference reopened for its final plenary meeting, during which 10 Member States announced their recognition of Palestine as a State.³² French President Emmanuel Macron stated that this recognition “paves the path for negotiations for the benefit of Israelis and Palestinians alike”, linking it to commitments by the Palestinian Authority in tandem to establish a renewed framework for democratic participation and comprehensively reform its governance.³³

Request for an advisory opinion on the obligations of States in respect of climate change

Background: On 29 May 2023, the GA requested an ICJ advisory opinion on the obligations of States in respect of climate change. Resulting from an initiative spearheaded by the Pacific Island State of Vanuatu beginning in 2021, the GA passed resolution 77/276 requesting that the Court consider “the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations” ([A/RES/77/276](#)). Further, the GA asked the court to rule on “the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment” with respect to “States, including, in particular, small island developing States” and “Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations.”³⁴

³⁰ The resolution is part of a recurring series of resolutions passed annually with the same title and much of the same language since the 1990s; however, the paragraph on the Conference was a new and unique addition.

³¹ Steps toward this end enumerated in the Declaration include bringing parties back to implementing the January 2025 ceasefire agreement mediated by Egypt, Qatar and the United States ([A/CONF.243/2025/1](#), para. 8), unifying Gaza and the West Bank under the governance of the Palestinian Authority (ibid., paras. 10-13) and deploying a temporary UN “stabilization mission” with a mandate to include monitoring the ceasefire and any future peace agreement (ibid., para. 15).

³² Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Portugal and the United Kingdom all used this opportunity to announce their support for recognition, some for the first time during the Conference and others having formally announced the day prior. San Marino followed suit the following day.

³³ Presidency of the French Republic, “Speech by the President of the French Republic at the Podium of the United Nations during the High-level International Conference for Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and Implementation of the Two-State Solution”, speech at the United Nations during the High-level international Conference for Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and Implementation of the Two-State Solution, 22 September 2025.

³⁴ The second question relates to harm caused “to the climate system and other parts of the environment, with respect to: (i) States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are particularly

During the 79th session, on 23 July 2025, the ICJ issued a unanimous advisory opinion in response to the two questions posed by resolution 77/276.³⁵ The Court found that “States have a duty to prevent significant harm to the environment” and a “duty to co-operate with each other in good faith to prevent significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment”.³⁶ This includes the obligation under the Paris Agreement on climate change to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Breaches of States’ obligations laid out by the advisory opinion were found to constitute an “internationally wrongful act”, the consequences of which may oblige States to cease the wrongful actions or omissions, provide “assurances and guarantees of non-repetition”, and/or provide “full reparation to injured States in the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction”.³⁷

GA consideration in the 80th session: On 20 May 2026, the GA adopted resolution 80/263 welcoming the ICJ’s advisory opinion and calling upon States to comply with obligations identified by the Court ([A/RES/80/263](#), paras. 1, 2).³⁸ The GA also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on ways to advance compliance with the Court’s findings during the 82nd session and decided to include follow-up on the advisory opinion as an agenda item of its 83rd session (*ibid.*, paras. 10, 11).

High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar

Background: Consideration of the situation of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar has featured on the GA’s agenda since 2017, particularly the human rights implications of military operations affecting Rohingya communities. In 2017, resolution 72/248 called for an end to the military operations and requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy on Myanmar to lend good offices on the matter ([A/RES/72/248](#), paras. 1(a), 10). The Secretary-General appointed an envoy in April 2018,³⁹ and the GA has continued to renew the position through to the present.⁴⁰ In parallel in 2017, the Human Rights Council established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar following repeated GA calls for independent investigations into alleged human rights violations ([A/HRC/RES/34/22](#)).⁴¹

The February 2021 military coup prompted intensified GA engagement on Myanmar, leading to the adoption of resolution [75/287](#), which condemned the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators and civilians, and called on the military to respect the 2020 election results, release detained political leaders, cease violence and prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar ([A/RES/75/287](#)). Subsequent resolutions on Myanmar repeated these calls and expressed support for efforts to resolve the crisis led by the Special Envoy.⁴²

During the 79th session, in response to the worsening humanitarian situation and continued violence in Myanmar, the GA decided via resolution 79/182 to hold a “high-level conference” on the situation of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar “in order to propose a comprehensive, innovative, concrete and time-bound plan for a sustainable resolution

vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change ... [and] (ii) Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change”.

³⁵ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2025.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ A total of eight countries voted against the resolution, including Belarus, Iran, Israel, Liberia, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Yemen.

³⁹ United Nations, “Ms. Christine Schraner Burgener of Switzerland - Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar”, 26 April 2018. Available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2018-04-26/ms-christine-schraner-burgener-of-switzerland-special-envoy-of-the-secretary-general-myanmar>.

⁴⁰ See [A/RES/72/248](#); [A/RES/73/264](#); [A/RES/74/246](#); [A/RES/75/238](#); [A/RES/76/180](#); [A/RES/77/227](#); [A/RES/78/219](#); [A/RES/79/182](#); [A/RES/80/221](#).

⁴¹ Several GA resolutions called attention to the human rights situation in Myanmar and urged accountability mechanisms, which created an important reference point for the HRC’s eventual establishment of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar in 2017. Among others, GA resolution 70/233, adopted in December 2015, raised “serious concern about the situation of the Rohingya in Rakhine State” and called for “full, transparent and independent investigations into all reports of human rights violations and abuses” ([A/RES/70/233](#)).

⁴² See [A/RES/76/180](#); [A/RES/77/227](#); [A/RES/78/219](#).

of the crisis” in 2025 ([A/RES/79/182](#), para. 36). In early 2025, the GA passed a resolution on the scope, modalities, format and organization of the Conference and set the date for 30 September 2025 ([A/RES/79/278](#), para. 1).

GA consideration in the 80th session: The GA convened the High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar on 30 September 2025, the final day of the High-Level Week opening the 80th session. During the meeting, 63 Member States and GA observers, as well as four civil society representatives, delivered statements. Plenary discussions focused on the root causes of the crisis, the challenges faced by Rohingya Muslims and other minorities, and humanitarian issues. The result was a summary document with recommendations on each of these themes, as well as on creating a conducive environment for the return of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities, with a view to reaching a sustainable resolution of the crisis.⁴³

Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States

Background: UNRWA’s mandate stems from the GA’s response to the Palestinian refugee crisis during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war ([A/RES/302\(IV\)](#) (1949)).⁴⁴ Following attacks by Hamas and other armed groups on Israeli territory and citizens on 7 October 2023, Israel launched a series of operations in Gaza, which resulted in the displacement of large portions of the population and which were also accompanied by significant limitations on humanitarian aid and relief.⁴⁵ On 28 October 2024, the Israeli Knesset adopted two laws that bar UNRWA from operating within Israel, no longer recognize UNRWA’s privileges and immunities, and prohibit Israeli authorities from having any contact with UNRWA staff.⁴⁶ In a 28 October 2024 letter to the GA, the Secretary-General noted that UNRWA had been the “main provider of basic and essential services” in Gaza, including health services to 1.1 million people and food assistance to 1.9 million people, and warned there was no “realistic alternative to UNRWA which could adequately provide the services and assistance required” should UNRWA’s operations be halted due to these laws ([A/79/558](#)). The Secretary-General also requested “guidance and support” from the GA “at this critical juncture in the history of UNRWA” (ibid.). Other international organizations and Member States reported Israeli limitations on their efforts to provide or support basic services and humanitarian and development assistance in the OPT.⁴⁷

In response to these dynamics, on 19 December 2024, the GA requested an ICJ advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations in relation to the presence and activities of the UN, other international organizations and third States in and in relation to the OPT ([A/RES/79/232](#), adopted by 137-12-22). Specifically, the GA requested the ICJ to consider:

⁴³ United Nations, “Summary of the High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar”, 30 September 2025. Available at https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/110/2025/11/Summary_High-level-Conference-on-the-Situation-of-Rohingya-Muslims-and-Other-Minorities-in-Myanmar.pdf.

⁴⁴ The GA provided UNRWA with the dual mandate to provide direct relief and to implement “works” projects to foster self-sufficiency, as well as to engage on political aspects of the refugee crisis ([A/RES/302\(IV\)](#)).

⁴⁵ On the nature of limitations on UN provision of assistance, see, for example, Elinor Hammarskjöld, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, *Written Reply of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Questions put by Vice-President Sebutinde and Judge Gómez Robledo at the End of the Oral Proceedings*, Written Proceedings, *Obligations of Israel in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Request for Advisory Opinion)*, 7 May 2025. Available at <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/196/196-20250507-oth-14-00-en.pdf>. For an overview of displacement trends, affected areas and aid distribution points as of August 2025, see OCHA, “Reported impact snapshot: Gaza Strip”, 20 August 2025. Available at <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-20-august-2025>.

⁴⁶ United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Bureau Calls Knesset’s Decision to Ban Palestinian Refugee Agency ‘Unlawful as the Occupation Itself’”, 21 October 2024. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2024/gapal1474.doc.htm>.

⁴⁷ Some examples of these limitations were identified by Member States in response to questions from members of the Court following a 2 May 2025 hearing of this case, including: *Contribution of the Republic of Türkiye in Response to the Question Posed by Honorable Judge Julia Sebutinde, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice*, Written Proceedings, *Obligations of Israel in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Request for Advisory Opinion)*, 7 May 2025. These and other supporting evidence are available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/196/other-documents>.

What are the obligations of Israel, as an occupying Power and as a member of the United Nations, in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, including its agencies and bodies, other international organizations and third States, in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including to ensure and facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population as well as of basic services and humanitarian and development assistance, for the benefit of the Palestinian civilian population, and in support of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination? ([A/RES/79/232](#), para. 10).

GA consideration in the 80th session: The ICJ delivered its advisory opinion on 22 October 2025. The Court found that Israel is obliged under international humanitarian law to ensure that the population of the OPT has essential supplies and to facilitate relief schemes to distribute those supplies, including by UNRWA (and in turn, Israel is obliged not to impede such relief) ([A/80/502](#), para. 223(3)(a), (b)). Additionally, the Court ruled that Israel, as an occupying power, “has an obligation ... to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights” of the OPT population, “including through the presence and activities of the United Nations” (ibid., para. 223(4)), and that Israel is obliged to “co-operate in good faith with the United Nations ... including [UNRWA]” (ibid., para. 223(5)). Further, Israel has an obligation “to ensure full respect for the privileges and immunities accorded to the United Nations, including its agencies and bodies” (ibid., para. 223(6)).

On 12 December 2025, the GA adopted resolution 80/116, welcoming the advisory opinion and affirming its findings ([A/RES/80/116](#), paras. 1, 3-4). The GA also demanded that Israel comply with its obligations under international law in the OPT, including to “administer the territory for the benefit of the local population”, to “cooperate in good faith with the UN” and not obstruct its functions, to ensure “full respect for the privileges and immunities of the United Nations”, to respect “the prohibition on forcible transfer and deportation” in the OPT and to prohibit “the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare”, among others (ibid., para. 5).

The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review

Background: Following the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the GA and the SC adopted identical resolutions ([A/RES/60/180](#); [S/RES/1645](#)) in December 2005 establishing the PBC, as an intergovernmental advisory body that could help “marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” ([A/RES/60/180](#), para. 2(a)). The 31 Member States on the PBC include those selected by the SC, the GA and the Economic and Social Council, as well as top providers of military and police personnel contributions to UN missions and of assessed contributions to UN funds. The same 2005 resolutions also established the PBSO to support the Commission and the PBF, managed by PBSO. Jointly, the PBC, PBSO and PBF are considered the core of the PBA within the UN system. Since that time, the PBA has emerged as a core part of the UN system and Member States' response to peace and security situations.

The founding 2005 resolutions mandated a review five years after their adoption to ensure that the arrangements were appropriate to fulfil the agreed functions (ibid., para. 27). This cycle of a review of the PBA every five years has continued since then, with a PBAR taking place in [2010](#), [2015](#) and [2020](#). Similar to the original identical resolutions that established the PBA, the formal output of each PBAR is the adoption of parallel resolutions by the GA and the SC either reaffirming and continuing past goals and mechanisms or offering further recommendations for adjustment of the PBA. The negotiation of these resolutions comprises the “formal” phase of the PBAR, and is an intergovernmental process that has tended to be led by Member State co-facilitators, one a sitting SC member and one nominated from the GA. This formal phase has tended to be preceded by an extended informal consultation phase that includes Member State and civil society consultations, as well as a Secretary-General report offering recommendations for the PBAR.

GA consideration in the 80th session: On 26 November 2025, the GA and SC adopted identical twin resolutions as the formal outputs of the 2025 PBAR ([A/RES/80/11](#); [S/RES/2805](#)).⁴⁸ The GA resolution 80/11 was adopted without a vote, and the SC adopted resolution 2805 unanimously.

In the preamble, both resolutions reaffirmed that development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, a provision that has been present in each of the PBAR resolutions since 2005. The preambles also expressed grave alarm at “the significant number of simultaneous security and humanitarian crises” facing the world currently and recognized the “vital role of the United Nations in preventing conflicts” (*ibid.*).⁴⁹ A new preambular provision recognized that “investing in conflict prevention is a highly cost-effective solution that results in saving lives, stabilizing economies, and reducing the need for costly military responses” (*ibid.*).

The resolutions contained 31 operative paragraphs, several of which focused on strengthening system-wide coordination and partnerships with key external actors. This included improving the “inter-agency coordination and synergy” of UN Country Teams (via the Resident Coordinator’s systems), as well as linking their efforts with those of the PBC (*ibid.*, para. 5). The resolution also encouraged more “systematic and strategic” collaboration with international financial institutions (IFIs) at the country level, including through more systematic use of partnership tools by resident coordinators (*ibid.*, para. 6). Greater partnerships between the PBC and IFIs, as well as between the PBC and regional organizations, including the African Union, were also the focus of several provisions (*ibid.*, paras. 8–10).

The resolutions also sought to strengthen linkages between peace operations and peacebuilding. One notable provision provides for the SC to consider referring countries transitioning off its agenda to the PBC, at the request and with the consent of the country concerned (*ibid.*, para. 1(c)). Another encourages the Secretary-General to consider how the PBF can further enhance its support for countries preparing for or undergoing transitions from peace operations (*ibid.*, para. 16).

The resolutions also included recommendations for strengthening financing for peacebuilding, regular and strategic dialogue between the PBC and the PBF to promote greater strategic alignment (*ibid.*, para. 14), as well as new reporting provisions on innovative financing and partnerships with IFIs (*ibid.*, paras. 19, 20). Notably, though, the resolutions did not reference GA resolution 78/257, which approved the allocation of \$50 million per year of assessed contributions to fund the PBF ([A/RES/78/257](#)).

⁴⁸ Inputs to this resolution included the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace ([A/79/552-S/2024/767](#)); a paper submitted by the PBC discussing the “main elements” that emerged from a series of consultations ([A/79/609-S/2024/827](#)); and a letter by the Group of Independent Eminent Persons ([A/79/634-S/2024/869](#)). These were also informed by a range of thematic and regional consultations that were convened by Member States, UN entities and civil society organizations throughout 2024.

⁴⁹ The language recognizing the “vital role of the United Nations in preventing conflicts” had appeared in the original 2005 resolutions’ preambles ([A/RES/60/180](#); [S/RES/1645](#)) but have not featured in every PBAR resolution.

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