

Implications of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on State Obligations around Climate Change for Future Generations

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Introduction

The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change (ICJAO), released on 23 July 2025, has been described by many as game changing. For decades, scientific clarity has been the backbone of discourse urging climate action. Now, with the publication of this Advisory Opinion, it is unequivocal that States are legally mandated to fulfill a systemic ensemble of vital climate, environmental and human rights obligations. At a minimum, States are obliged to take necessary action to preserve the integrity of the climate system, for other States and people worldwide.

While the world can legitimately celebrate the ICJAO as a historical legal victory with the potential of leading to concrete action, it is limited in scope and comes at a time when seven out of nine planetary boundaries have already been crossed.¹ Notably, it also fails to clearly outline the international law implications for future generations. This Discussion Paper provides an initial analysis of what the ICJAO has delivered and what it has left unanswered regarding future generations.

Irrespective of the ICJAO outcome, its realization is the culmination of six years of continued advocacy by youth across the island nations of the Pacific, who are among the most affected by climate change. What started as classroom conversations led to the formation of Pacific Island Students Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC), and ultimately to securing Pacific Islands Forum support that pressured the United Nations General Assembly to mandate the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to produce its Advisory Opinion.² Thanks to the leadership of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), particularly Vanuatu, the resolution was adopted unanimously.³

How the ICJAO Advances the Rights of Future Generations

In its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stressed that **State action on climate change mitigation and adaptation over the next few years will fundamentally shape the environment that future generations will inhabit**. Citing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the ICJ writes that “[c]ontinued emissions will further affect all major climate system components, and many changes will be irreversible on centennial to millennial time scales and become larger with increasing global warming”.⁴ Perhaps most importantly, the Court’s interpretation of States’ obligations establishes a novel rule-based, systemic approach to addressing climate change, which can only bear positive consequences for future generations.

On Protecting the Climate System

The Court holds that obligations arising from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are binding.⁵ It posits that the 1.5°C global temperature limitation objective – revised down from the previously held 2°C legal ceiling – is “parties’ agreed primary temperature goal for limiting the global average temperature increase

¹ Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, “Seven of nine planetary boundaries now breached”, 24 September 2025. Available at <https://www.stockholmresilience.org/news--events/general-news/2025-09-24-seven-of-nine-planetary-boundaries-now-breached.html>.

² Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change, “Our Journey”. Available at <https://www.pisfcc.org/ourjourney> (last accessed on 19 February 2026).

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2025*, para. 156. Available at <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20250723-adv-01-00-en.pdf>.

⁵ Ibid, paras. 268-270.

under the Paris Agreement”.⁶ While the IPCC is clear that a 1.5°C increase is not safe,⁷ the ICJAO brings the Paris Agreement closer to what scientific imperatives dictate, making future generations significantly safer. The 1.5°C objective is, therefore, reinforced as a North Star for present and future generations’ interests, safeguarding the relevance of the Paris Agreement itself.

The ICJAO concludes that parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) must collectively be “capable of achieving the temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”, with the view of achieving the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.⁸ **Once again, the ICJ may have rescued the credibility of international climate diplomacy by asserting that States’ mitigation targets must add up to meet global objectives.**

Regarding NDC preparation and realization, respectively, the ICJAO holds parties to obligations of results⁹ and stringent due diligence,¹⁰ such that “each party has to do its utmost to ensure that the NDCs it puts forward represent its highest possible ambition”.¹¹

Additionally, the ICJAO extends mitigation obligations **beyond parties to climate treaties**. Under the *erga omnes* customary international law obligation to prevent significant environmental harm, all States – regardless of treaty participation – are bound to reduce their emissions with the imperative of maintaining a stable climate system.¹² In this way, the Court affirms that climate action is not merely a matter of voluntary political will, but a shared legal duty under international law.

On Creating Real Accountability for Climate Harms

To respond effectively to the climate crisis, legal systems must remove barriers that prevent accountability. This begins with clearly defining State responsibility and the nature of available remedies. The ICJAO plays an important role by clarifying legal obligations and setting out potential consequences for non-compliance. Specifically, it establishes that failure to comply with climate obligations can constitute **internationally wrongful acts**, thereby potentially engaging State liability before international tribunals.¹³ While several States pleaded the impossibility of establishing causality between climate-induced harms and one or more States’ specific conduct,¹⁴ the ICJ maintains its general view that “a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus” allows for the granting of reparations.¹⁵

This could give **high-emitting, wealthy States an immediate material interest in negotiating efficient and well-funded loss and damage mechanisms**, especially insofar as the ICJAO underscores that all State actions and omissions, including both legislative and administrative acts (e.g. subsidies or authorizations for fossil fuel projects), could constitute *internationally wrongful acts*.¹⁶ This includes failures to regulate the activities of private actors, namely high-emitting industries at the root of climate-induced harm.¹⁷

⁶ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 224.

⁷ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities”, in *Global Warming of 1.5°C: an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty* (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 447. Available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/>.

⁸ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 235.

⁹ *Ibid*, para. 235.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, paras. 246-254.

¹¹ *Ibid*, para. 253.

¹² *Ibid*, para. 253.

¹³ *Ibid*, para. 440.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, para. 444.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, para. 434.

¹⁶ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 436.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, para. 445.

Beyond climate liability, the ICJAO establishes rules likely to mitigate the violence downstream of climate change impacts. One key example is the extension of States' duty of non-refoulement toward climate-displaced people, "where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the right to life".¹⁸ This grants unprecedented legal leverage for creating a *climate refugee* status as an amendment to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

On the Feasibility of Upholding Climate Justice through Judicial Means

The ICJAO may be used as a transformative jurisprudential authority, given the path it provides at the domestic level for effective judicial branch oversight over legislative and executive branches. The affirmation that State liability under international law can now, theoretically, be engaged by any State action or omission, and that conduct must be considered in its globality and in view of its cumulative effects,¹⁹ could play a key role in climate cases worldwide.

For example, Canadian courts have adopted contradictory postures. In *Adkin-Kaya et al. v. Canada*, where four youth were challenging the constitutionality of the Federal Government's purchase and construction of the Transmountain Expansion Project pipeline in light of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rights to life, liberty and security,^{20,21} the Federal Court dismissed the case, finding "no evidence supporting the applicants' Charter claims".²² While other matters also played into the case, arguing for the Government's responsibility for climate-induced harm based on a single high-emitting industrial project proved to be difficult.

Conversely, 15 youth plaintiffs (including myself) brought forth the *La Rose v. Canada* case under the same section of the *Canadian Charter*. The case was also dismissed in part for targeting the Federal Government's many actions and omissions, causing its disproportionate responsibility for the climate crisis. The Federal Court judge considered "the Plaintiffs' approach of alleging an overly broad and unquantifiable number of actions and inactions" unreceivable, as an attempt to "subject a holistic policy response to climate change to *Charter* review".²³

Yet dangerously high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions result from specific laws, regulations, public subsidies, fossil fuel project authorizations and many other actions and omissions. While these can realistically be listed, they cannot reasonably be tied, individually, to specific and discrete climate-induced harms as required by the standards of causality in individual constitutional cases. Thus, the ICJAO may help consolidate jurisprudential doctrine toward recognizing that the requirement to assess the legality of each source of emissions individually would essentially preclude the exercise of judicial oversight on climate-related matters and that this reasoning is therefore contrary to the rule of law.

This aspect may be critical given the challenges that causality criteria pose to government accountability for direct or indirect GHG emissions. Restricting State accountability to select policies condemns climate litigation to being very resource-consuming for civil society, with little probability of gains. Any evolution, though on a multi-year scale, could bear transformative outcomes within national judicial systems worldwide.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, para. 427.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, para. 252.

²⁰ Mel Woods, "Teens Fighting To Take Feds To Court Over Trans Mountain Pipeline", *Huffpost*, (30 July 2019). Available at https://www.huffpost.com/archive/ca/entry/teens-suing-federal-government-pipeline_ca_5d40983de4b0db8affaf8c75.

²¹ Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (United Kingdom), Part I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), sect. 7. Available at <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html>.

²² Federal Court of Appeal (Canada), *Raincoast Conservation Foundation v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2019 FCA 224, Judgement, 2019, para. 70. Available at <https://canlii.ca/t/j28lp>.

²³ Federal Court (Canada), *La Rose v. Canada*, 2020 FC 1008, para. 40. Available at <https://canlii.ca/t/jb8f7>.

Limitations of the ICJAO Concerning Future Generations

Future generations were deliberately included in both questions posed to the ICJ,²⁴ creating hope that judges would interpret international law through the specific **temporal lens necessary to achieve effective fulfillment of obligations toward them**. However, the ICJAO falls short of several opportunities to achieve significant progress for future generations.

The ICJ refrains from explicitly affirming the core precept underscoring the Maastricht Principles on the Human Rights of Future Generations (“Maastricht Principles”), according to which “[h]uman rights extend to all members of the human family, including both present and future”.²⁵ Despite highlighting that the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment “is the foundation for human life”²⁶ – and that States must therefore preserve the preconditions for the enjoyment of human rights²⁷ – this obligation differs from any **formal recognition of future generations as rights-bearing subjects**.

Moreover, in referring to “present and future generations”²⁸ without much distinction, the ICJ precludes any affirmations that could help secure the rights of future generations. While this formulation may be understood as implicitly reinforcing the premise of the Maastricht Principles, it does not clarify the applicability of current obligations owed to future generations specifically.

In so doing, the ICJAO is in continuity with dominant legal paradigms whereby State non-compliance with obligations **can only be justiciable once the harm has already been inflicted at least in part, and future generations thus remain in a grey area**. A *sui generis* obligatory framework, designed to provide adequate legal protection for future generations through a preventive model of long-term governance and judicial enforcement, remains an ongoing project.

On Intergenerational Equity

While the ICJAO’s recognition of intergenerational equity as an interpretative tool for analysing climate obligations in line with treaties and customary international law can be seen as positive, it relies on essentially symbolic references to future generations, such as those found in the preamble and article 3.1 of the Paris Agreement.²⁹ This understanding suggests that intergenerational equity should be treated as no more than a general, elusive, symbolic consideration.

However, 40 years of doctrinal developments have outlined key tenets for a practical understanding of intergenerational equity. The ICJ could have acknowledged this overarching structure and its essential components even while limiting itself to a strictly symbolic recognition of intergenerational equity. For example, Brown Weiss posits in *In Fairness to Future Generations* the **planetary obligations** framework as a concrete set of duties for realizing intergenerational equity.³⁰ In comparison, the ICJ’s affirmation that “due regard” be paid to “the interests of future generations and the long-term implications of conduct [...] where States contemplate”,³¹ entails only minimal implementation, and discounts the human rights of future people altogether.

²⁴ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 88.

²⁵ Rights of Future Generations, *Maastricht Principles on the Human Rights of Future Generations* (2023), para. 2. Available at <https://www.rightsoffuturegenerations.org/the-principles>.

²⁶ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 373.

²⁷ *Ibid*, para. 373.

²⁸ *Ibid*, paras. 273, 373.

²⁹ *Ibid*, para. 155.

³⁰ Edith Brown Weiss, *In Fairness to Future Generations* (Tokyo, United Nations University, 1989). Available at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/196661?ln=en>.

³¹ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 157.

On the Precautionary Principle and the Duty to Prevent

While the State obligations outlined by the ICJAO are justifiably broad, the failure to make the implications of the precautionary principle more explicit in light of current geophysical, scientific, economic, environmental and social realities significantly undermines their applicability. Judge Charlesworth's individual opinion holds that the ICJAO "does not explain how the precautionary principle applies in the context of climate change, and how it fits into the fabric of States' climate change obligations".³² She delineates the precautionary principle from the duty to prevent, highlighting that "[p]revention focuses on 'risk', while precaution focuses on 'uncertainty'", and that they therefore "operate on a continuum and complement each other".³³

In that light, the ICJAO's provision that "States should [...] not refrain from or delay taking actions of prevention in the face of scientific uncertainty"³⁴ is undoubtedly positive. Nonetheless, the ICJAO contains no clearly actionable definition of the precautionary principle that could serve as clear guidance regarding the nature and scope of the relevant obligations. For example, as judge Charlesworth underscores, "[t]he Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on climate change and international law offers a valuable model [...] setting out how the precautionary principle informs States' obligations to conduct an environmental impact assessment".³⁵

Without similar interpretative clarity, States may argue that they are bound not by a duty to prevent highly probable harms evidenced by climate science, but by a looser principle of precaution regarding potential harms. This shortcoming is reflected in the failure to address the ethical question of associating risks with corresponding obligations, which is crucial for exercising precaution in environmental and climate matters.³⁶ In other words, **there is danger in the fact that the ICJ is silent on the means for achieving these broad climate objectives, which will also largely define the world that present and future generations live in.**

On this front, the ICJAO itself seems to compromise the precautionary principle. It may not have been appropriate for the ICJAO to examine specific IPCC GHG mitigation pathway scenarios. Yet, they are all calculated based on probabilities; they are inherently associated with risk. For example, achieving net-zero CO₂ emissions requires carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures to compensate for "hard-to-abate" emissions.³⁷ According to the IPCC, CDR methods include "[r]eforestation, improved forest management, soil carbon sequestration, peatland restoration and blue carbon management", "afforestation or production of biomass crops for BECCS [Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage] or biochar", and "[o]cean fertilization".³⁸

Foregrounding some CDR methods over others affects the likelihood of achieving a 1.5°C limitation on global temperature increase, and the ICJAO remains silent regarding precaution when it comes to relying on CDR. Specifically, many CDR methods also threaten human rights and the integrity of ecosystems. For instance, afforestation (planting trees on land that hasn't recently

³² *Separate Opinion of Judge Charlesworth, Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2025*, para. 3. Available at <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20250723-adv-01-08-en.pdf>.

³³ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

³⁴ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 293.

³⁵ *Separate Opinion of Judge Charlesworth, Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 7.

³⁶ Carolyn Raffensperger and Peter L. deFur, "Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Rigorous Science and Solid Ethics", *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal*, vol. 5, No. 5 (Month 1999), pp. 933–941. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/10807039991289211>.

³⁷ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) Summary for Policymakers* (2023), para C.11. Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. C.11.2.

been forested) requires land on which to plant trees that can capture carbon on the requisite scale; this has given rise to (unequivocally documented) land grabs and violations of the rights of Indigenous and rural communities.^{39,40}

Similarly, carbon capture and storage (CCS) approaches remain limited in scale and face several obstacles, as evidenced by only 28 commercial-scale projects out of 300 globally being operational in 2020.⁴¹ Nor are these projects a panacea to climate woes: about 70 per cent of the carbon captured by Canadian CCS projects was used to extract more oil,⁴² and these projects have afforded Canadian fossil fuel companies at least Can\$12.9 billion (about \$9.3 billion) in public subsidies.⁴³ However, the ICJAO does not address any of the often existential risks inherent to climate policy, thereby undermining the relevance of the preventive norms it acknowledges.

The outcome could have been different or gone further. For example, recognition of the customary international duty to prevent significant environmental harm could have led to more preventative outcomes in the ICJAO. For instance, the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report states that “[p]rojected cumulative future CO₂ emissions over the lifetime of existing and currently planned fossil fuel infrastructure [...] exceed the total cumulative net CO₂ in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot”.⁴⁴ Considering this alongside the ICJAO’s general reasoning, a clear obligation to implement a coordinated fossil fuel phase-out could have been outlined. This obligation could have complemented and bolstered the duty to regulate activities within States’ jurisdictions to comply with 1.5°C limitation scenarios.⁴⁵

On the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Land-Based Communities and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

As environmental degradation compromises the very ability to perpetuate specific identities and land-based lifestyles and worldviews, the intersection of intergenerational equity and the rights of Indigenous peoples and land-based communities is critical. In the worst cases, entire territories risk disappearing due to sea-level rise.⁴⁶ Worldwide, core practices and elements of language are lost as species disappear and natural cycles undergo irreversible changes.⁴⁷

In the context of already ongoing systemic climate impacts on Indigenous people’s lands, the elimination of all forms of discrimination, for instance, cannot be achieved. Yet, the ICJ does not address the realization of such rights in this context. The ICJAO reiterates the Paris Agreement’s preamble, providing that climate obligations must be met through actions that “respect, promote and consider the rights of indigenous peoples [and] local communities,”⁴⁸ without elaborating further. Thus, the ICJ

³⁹ The Energy and Resources Institute & The Infravision Foundation, *Study on Implementation of Compensatory Afforestation in India: Final Report* (2024). Available at <https://theinfravisionfoundation.org/assets/pdf/Study-on-Implementation-of-Compensatory-Afforestation-in-India.pdf>.

⁴⁰ iPES Food, *Land Squeeze: What is driving unprecedented pressures on farmland and what can be done to achieve equitable access to land?* (2024). Available at <https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/LandSqueeze.pdf>.

⁴¹ David C. Rode and others, “Six Principles to guide large-scale carbon capture and storage development”, *Energy Research & Social Science*, vol. 103, No. 103214 (September 2023). Available at <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629623002748#bb0015>.

⁴² Environmental Defence, *Buyer Beware: Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Carbon Capture Fairy Tales in Canada* (2022), p. 12. Available at <https://environmentaldefence.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Buyer-Beware-FFS-in-2021-March-2022.pdf>.

⁴³ Laura Cameron and Angela Carter, *Why Carbon Capture and Storage Is Not a Net-Zero Solution for Canada’s Oil and Gas Sector* (Winnipeg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2023). Available at <https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2023-02/bottom-line-carbon-capture-not-net-zero-solution.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) Summary for Policymakers* (2023), para. B.7.

⁴⁵ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 252.

⁴⁶ Joe Phelan, “What countries and cities will disappear due to rising sea levels”, *Live Science*, 27 March 2022. Available at <https://www.livescience.com/what-places-disappear-rising-sea-levels>.

⁴⁷ Samantha Chisholm Hatfield and others, “Indian time: time, seasonality, and culture in Traditional Ecological Knowledge of climate change”, *Ecological Processes*, vol. 7, No. 25 (July 2018). Available at <https://ecologicalprocesses.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13717-018-0136-6>.

⁴⁸ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, para. 382.

overlooks the compounding threats faced by these communities, as their territories are also deeply impacted by the extraction of critical minerals for decarbonization purposes⁴⁹ or land financialization for carbon offset transactions.⁵⁰

Similarly, despite acknowledging that climate impacts constitute potential violations of the rights to health, adequate standards of living – encompassing food, water and housing – and to privacy, family and home,⁵¹ the ICJAO withholds further interpretation. Overall, the question remains: amidst ecological collapse, how must Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) progressively be achieved in accordance with the principle of non-regression? The traditional understanding of obligations arising from ESCR as being essentially positive (requiring positive State action) appears null when, for example, dry rivers make it impossible for Amazonian communities to access schools or hospitals.⁵²

Conclusion

The ICJAO is, indisputably, cause for celebration. Laying out a coherent, cohesive and actionable obligatory framework towards maintaining a safe and stable climate system constitutes a historic step toward State accountability in the present, and for the benefit of future generations. Nevertheless, critical elements of international law remain unexplored, undermining the long-term governance and judicial oversight necessary for the well-being of present and future generations, and neglecting crucial facets of human rights and the rights of future generations.

Overall, States can no longer pretend to adhere to the rule of law while treating their climate obligations as strictly voluntary or charitable acts of goodwill. As the coming months and years elucidate the real-life impacts of the ICJAO, several pathways for more decisive climate action can already be highlighted:

Climate litigation:

- Most affected States with proportionally low cumulative emissions could file unprecedented cases against high-emitting wealthy States before international tribunals, demanding an end to wrongful conduct and restitution or compensation.
- Most affected people and communities could have an even stronger standing to bring their States before international human rights bodies over violations of climate obligations arising from international human rights instruments.
- The ICJAO's authoritative jurisprudential framework could bolster strategic climate litigation at the domestic level on several aspects, such as expanding the definition of what can constitute wrongful State conduct.

Climate negotiations:

- The recognition of a *de jure* liability for climate-induced injuries could provide an unprecedented material incentive for high-emitting wealthy States to contribute to the loss and damage fund on the necessary scale and motivate progress in negotiations on climate finance in general.
- The obligation for States to collectively adopt NDCs that are in line with meeting the 1.5°C temperature increase limitation objective could bolster negotiations on mitigation.

⁴⁹ Jenny Monnet, "'Green colonialism': Indigenous world leaders warn over west's climate strategy", *The Guardian*, 23 April 2023. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/23/un-indigenous-peoples-forum-climate-strategy-warning>.

⁵⁰ Claire McConnell and others, "Carbon Offset Deals and the Risks of 'Green Grabbing'", *International Institute for Sustainable Development*, 15 May 2024. Available at <https://www.iisd.org/articles/insight/carbon-offset-deals-risks-green-grabbing>.

⁵¹ *Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, paras. 379-382.

⁵² Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change and others, *People's Petition: A Collective Climate Justice Call for the ICJ* (2024), pp. 21-23. Available at <https://www.pisfcc.org/peoplespetition>.

The core of the matter is now political, as shown by the recent pressures for dilution and withdrawal of Vanuatu's proposed resolution aimed at bringing the ICJAO outcome before the UN General Assembly. Because with new legal clarity, the ICJAO release marks the beginning of a new, much more critical phase. Civil society, local communities, social movements and the most affected States must now incorporate it into their respective strategies for achieving climate justice. The ICJAO is not a relief: it increases our responsibility, both collectively and individually.

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